P
Peter Cole
Guest
Mark Hickey wrote:
> Peter Cole <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>
>>Mark Hickey wrote:
>>The UNMOVIC reports did not indicate the presence of a clear and present
>>danger -- at least not that I've seen, perhaps you can cite?
>
>
> It says, for example, that the presumption is that Iraq has 10,000
> liters of anthrax on hand, and the ability to make plenty more in
> dual-use facilities.
The report *speculates* that another 7-10K liters of anthrax was
produced above the 8K liters that Iraq admitted. They based this
unaccounted for growth medium (240 kg) and fermenter records. The
records were from January '91. The reason anthrax was focused on was
that it has the potential shelf life to still be viable. Nobody
suggested anthrax was being produced in the 12 years between that date
and the invasion.
10K liters sounds like a lot, but the sprayers they had experimented
with were based on drop fuel tanks and had a capacity of 2K liter. This
means, even if they had produced the extra anthrax and successfully hid
it in the desert for 12 years, they'd be able to fly 5 sorties --
providing they had an operational Mirage or 2 and intact sprayer systems.
After a couple of years of looking, neither the anthrax or the delivery
components have been found. Iraq, of course, never had a chance of
getting a Mirage off the ground.
>>>Personally, I see no reason to have assumed Saddam wasn't lying. He
>>>had every reason to provide proof of the destruction of his WMD stores
>>>IF he had actually destroyed them.
>>
>>Iraq's production facilities and, more importantly, their delivery
>>systems were too crude to present any real threat.
>
>
> I'd disagree - as did the UN (or there wouldn't have been any
> sanctions). FWIW, the weapons and delivery systems did a pretty
> effective job on the Kurds.
So would have any crop duster. The Kurds were unarmed and living under
Iraqi controlled airspace. The same equipment did not pose a credible
threat to Iraqi neighbors, much less the US.
>>It was well known by
>>GWII how much had been destroyed during and after GWI.
>
>
> That would make him the only person involved who DID know then... (
GWII = Gulf War II
>>The UNMOVIC
>>reports mentioned "intelligence sources" as claiming movement of
>>munitions and active underground facilities, but they were never able to
>>confirm these accusations. As it turned out, they were false.
>
>
> No way to KNOW that the reports were false (if indeed they were -
> don't forget that a VX weapon was exploded by the insurgents, who
> obviously didn't KNOW it was a VX weapon).
I didn't know that:
"No chemical weapons are known to have been used so far in Iraq's
insurgency."
--Washington Post Aug 13, 2005
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/13/AR2005081300530.html>
>>Iraq developed chemical & biological weapons to offset the manpower
>>superiority of Iran during their long, bloody war. It seems they felt
>>their stockpile could serve as a deterrent after the war, the admitted
>>strategy was to deploy but only use if Iraq was invaded. It seems they
>>stuck to that, and then tried to destroy as much evidence of their
>>(illegal) weapons programs after GWI.
>
>
> Perhaps (and I certainly hope so). The stinky wrinkle in the whole
> "Saddam destroyed it all" theory is that he had every reason to simply
> document and confirm the destruction... he could still be in power
> today had he done so. I can't really imagine a scenario where he
> really DID destroy all the WMD but refused to save his own bacon
> (oops, probably culturally insensitive phrase...) by letting the UN
> know.
It was obvious to the UNMOVIC report writers that the Iraqi regime
attempted to destroy evidence of prior illegal weapons programs and use.
They were, in fact, illegal under international law.
The only value of the weapons after the Iraq-Iran war was to deter
attack from Israel -- the poor man's Mutually Assured Destruction plan,
if you will. After the failed attempt to annex Kuwait, Iraq realized
that the weapons were only a liability against the US.
All of the Iraqi WMD programs were conducted in a clandestine fashion
(like WMD programs all over the world, including the US). Furthermore,
there was hasty production to meet the needs of the war with Iran. It's
not surprising that there were gaps in the documentation. Clearly, Iraq
did destroy the bulk of its WMD 12 years before the invasion -- did it
destroy them all? Who knows. It is logically impossible to prove
something doesn't exist. Even if the agents exist still (though you'd
think some would have been found by now if they did), there was never
any system to threaten the US with. There are many paths to production
of terrorist (as opposed to tactical) quantities of chem/bio warfare
agents as shown by Sarin and anthrax attacks not linked to any foreign
state.
>>In any case, nothing has been found now in years of searching, and the
>>UNMOVIC reports hardly provided justification for invasion -- quite the
>>contrary.
>
>
> Your conclusions are very much different from mine. The report is a
> damning one, postulating that Iraq had developed sophisticated
> weapons, production facilities, and was working on various delivery
> systems (including UAVs). The very title of the document ("unresolved
> issues") is a strong hint as to the conclusions they draw.
If you read the contents at <http://www.unmovic.or>, specifically :
"7) Briefing of the Security Council, 7 March 2003: Oral introduction of
the 12th quarterly report of UNMOVIC"
You'll see that the tone of the document is not pessimistic, hardly
"damning". "Unresolved" means precisely that, it certainly didn't
suggest proof of the existence of weapons or continuing WMD programs. Of
course after the invasion, the accusations of unnamed "intelligence
agencies" were not shown to have any substance. By official and credible
accounts (UNMOVIC) substantial progress was being made towards resolving
the "unresolved" issues in the months immediately preceding the
invasion. That very progress was a more likely motive for the timing of
the invasion than any incipient threat. As time went on, the case for
hidden WMD was only likely to weaken.
> Peter Cole <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>
>>Mark Hickey wrote:
>>The UNMOVIC reports did not indicate the presence of a clear and present
>>danger -- at least not that I've seen, perhaps you can cite?
>
>
> It says, for example, that the presumption is that Iraq has 10,000
> liters of anthrax on hand, and the ability to make plenty more in
> dual-use facilities.
The report *speculates* that another 7-10K liters of anthrax was
produced above the 8K liters that Iraq admitted. They based this
unaccounted for growth medium (240 kg) and fermenter records. The
records were from January '91. The reason anthrax was focused on was
that it has the potential shelf life to still be viable. Nobody
suggested anthrax was being produced in the 12 years between that date
and the invasion.
10K liters sounds like a lot, but the sprayers they had experimented
with were based on drop fuel tanks and had a capacity of 2K liter. This
means, even if they had produced the extra anthrax and successfully hid
it in the desert for 12 years, they'd be able to fly 5 sorties --
providing they had an operational Mirage or 2 and intact sprayer systems.
After a couple of years of looking, neither the anthrax or the delivery
components have been found. Iraq, of course, never had a chance of
getting a Mirage off the ground.
>>>Personally, I see no reason to have assumed Saddam wasn't lying. He
>>>had every reason to provide proof of the destruction of his WMD stores
>>>IF he had actually destroyed them.
>>
>>Iraq's production facilities and, more importantly, their delivery
>>systems were too crude to present any real threat.
>
>
> I'd disagree - as did the UN (or there wouldn't have been any
> sanctions). FWIW, the weapons and delivery systems did a pretty
> effective job on the Kurds.
So would have any crop duster. The Kurds were unarmed and living under
Iraqi controlled airspace. The same equipment did not pose a credible
threat to Iraqi neighbors, much less the US.
>>It was well known by
>>GWII how much had been destroyed during and after GWI.
>
>
> That would make him the only person involved who DID know then... (
GWII = Gulf War II
>>The UNMOVIC
>>reports mentioned "intelligence sources" as claiming movement of
>>munitions and active underground facilities, but they were never able to
>>confirm these accusations. As it turned out, they were false.
>
>
> No way to KNOW that the reports were false (if indeed they were -
> don't forget that a VX weapon was exploded by the insurgents, who
> obviously didn't KNOW it was a VX weapon).
I didn't know that:
"No chemical weapons are known to have been used so far in Iraq's
insurgency."
--Washington Post Aug 13, 2005
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/13/AR2005081300530.html>
>>Iraq developed chemical & biological weapons to offset the manpower
>>superiority of Iran during their long, bloody war. It seems they felt
>>their stockpile could serve as a deterrent after the war, the admitted
>>strategy was to deploy but only use if Iraq was invaded. It seems they
>>stuck to that, and then tried to destroy as much evidence of their
>>(illegal) weapons programs after GWI.
>
>
> Perhaps (and I certainly hope so). The stinky wrinkle in the whole
> "Saddam destroyed it all" theory is that he had every reason to simply
> document and confirm the destruction... he could still be in power
> today had he done so. I can't really imagine a scenario where he
> really DID destroy all the WMD but refused to save his own bacon
> (oops, probably culturally insensitive phrase...) by letting the UN
> know.
It was obvious to the UNMOVIC report writers that the Iraqi regime
attempted to destroy evidence of prior illegal weapons programs and use.
They were, in fact, illegal under international law.
The only value of the weapons after the Iraq-Iran war was to deter
attack from Israel -- the poor man's Mutually Assured Destruction plan,
if you will. After the failed attempt to annex Kuwait, Iraq realized
that the weapons were only a liability against the US.
All of the Iraqi WMD programs were conducted in a clandestine fashion
(like WMD programs all over the world, including the US). Furthermore,
there was hasty production to meet the needs of the war with Iran. It's
not surprising that there were gaps in the documentation. Clearly, Iraq
did destroy the bulk of its WMD 12 years before the invasion -- did it
destroy them all? Who knows. It is logically impossible to prove
something doesn't exist. Even if the agents exist still (though you'd
think some would have been found by now if they did), there was never
any system to threaten the US with. There are many paths to production
of terrorist (as opposed to tactical) quantities of chem/bio warfare
agents as shown by Sarin and anthrax attacks not linked to any foreign
state.
>>In any case, nothing has been found now in years of searching, and the
>>UNMOVIC reports hardly provided justification for invasion -- quite the
>>contrary.
>
>
> Your conclusions are very much different from mine. The report is a
> damning one, postulating that Iraq had developed sophisticated
> weapons, production facilities, and was working on various delivery
> systems (including UAVs). The very title of the document ("unresolved
> issues") is a strong hint as to the conclusions they draw.
If you read the contents at <http://www.unmovic.or>, specifically :
"7) Briefing of the Security Council, 7 March 2003: Oral introduction of
the 12th quarterly report of UNMOVIC"
You'll see that the tone of the document is not pessimistic, hardly
"damning". "Unresolved" means precisely that, it certainly didn't
suggest proof of the existence of weapons or continuing WMD programs. Of
course after the invasion, the accusations of unnamed "intelligence
agencies" were not shown to have any substance. By official and credible
accounts (UNMOVIC) substantial progress was being made towards resolving
the "unresolved" issues in the months immediately preceding the
invasion. That very progress was a more likely motive for the timing of
the invasion than any incipient threat. As time went on, the case for
hidden WMD was only likely to weaken.
