The Colonial Precedent
http://www.commondreams.org/views04/1026-24.htm
The Growing Brutality and Deception of the Iraq War Mirrors Britain's
Recent Imperial History
by Mark Curtis
The redeployment of British forces in Iraq to support a US assault on
Falluja marks another stage in a creeping return to the colonial era,
when popular revolts against occupation were routinely suppressed by
overwhelming force. These past episodes, revealed in declassified
British government files, provide numerous parallels with Iraq, and
suggest a pattern of future blunders and atrocities. Those in Britain
who like to regard more recent military interventions as humanitarian
might dwell on those parallels as the latest phase of the Iraq war
unfolds.
British ministers' claim to be defending civilisation against
barbarity in Iraq finds a powerful echo in 1950s Kenya, when Britain
sought to smash an uprising against colonial rule. Yet, while the
British media and political class expressed horror at the tactics of
the Mau Mau, the worst abuses were committed by the occupiers. The
colonial police used methods like slicing off ears, flogging until
death and pouring paraffin over suspects who were then set alight.
British forces killed around 10,000 Kenyans during the Mau Mau
campaign, compared with the 600 deaths among the colonial forces and
European civilians. Some British battalions kept scoreboards recording
kills, and gave ยฃ5 rewards for the first sub-unit to kill an
insurgent, whose hands were often chopped off to make fingerprinting
easier. "Free fire zones" were set up, where any African could be shot
on sight.
As opposition to British rule intensified, brutal "resettlement"
operations, which led to the deaths of tens of thousands, forced
around 90,000 into detention camps. In this 1950s version of Abu
Ghraib prison in Iraq, forced labour and beatings were systematic and
disease rampant. Former camp officers described "short rations,
overwork, brutality and flogging" and "Japanese methods of torture".
Guerrillas resisting British rule were routinely designated
"terrorists", as now in Iraq. Britain never admitted that it was
opposing a popular, nationalist rebellion in Kenya. Similarly,
leftwing Malayan insurgents fighting British rule in the 1950s had
strong popular support among the Chinese community but were officially
called "terrorists". In secret, however, Foreign Office correspondence
described the war as being fought "in defence of [the] rubber
industry", then controlled by British and European companies.
But under the banner of fighting communism, British forces were given
free rein in Malaya. Collective punishments were inflicted on villages
for aiding insurgents. A shoot-to-kill policy was promoted, tens of
thousands of people were removed into "new villages" and used as cheap
labour, and British soldiers had themselves photographed holding
guerrillas' decapitated heads. The idea that the revolt was ended
through "winning hearts and minds" is a myth; it was crushed by
overwhelming force, such as massive aerial bombing.
The brutality needed to be kept secret, a key theme in suppressing
revolts. After Britain intervened to crush a rebellion in Oman in
1957, an internal Foreign Office minute stated that "we want to avoid
the RAF killing Arabs if possible, especially as there will be
newspaper correspondents on the spot". The British army commander in
Oman later noted that "great pains were taken throughout the Command
to keep all operational actions out of the press".
The reason for this was that Britain committed numerous war crimes in
Oman, including the systematic bombing of civilian targets such as
water supplies and farms. These attacks "would deter dissident
villages from gathering their crops" and ensure "denial of water",
officials stated in private. Bombing was intended to "show the
population the power of weapons at our disposal" and to convince them
that "resistance will be fruitless and lead only to hardship".
Britain was defending an extremely repressive regime where smoking in
public, playing football and talking to anyone for more than 15
minutes were banned. Yet Harold Macmillan told President Kennedy in a
1957 telegram that "we believe that the sultan is a true friend to the
west and is doing his best for his people".
As Blair and Bush claim to support democracy in Iraq, it is as well to
remember that London and Washington have almost always opposed
popular, democratic forces in the Middle East, preferring strong
regimes capable of bringing "order".
Britain's stance on the US war in Vietnam offers other useful lessons.
Just as Tony Blair poses as providing a brake on US tactics in Iraq,
Harold Wilson claimed to do the same over Vietnam. Yet Britain
secretly backed the US in every stage of military escalation.
In July 1965, when the US doubled its ground troop numbers in Vietnam,
Wilson privately reassured President Johnson of his support for US
policies "in the interests of peace and stability".
The Wilson-Johnson correspondence highlights a shocking level of
connivance between No 10 and the White House to deceive the public.
When the US first bombed Hanoi and Haiphong in June 1966, Wilson
issued a statement disassociating the government from the bombing. Yet
this statement had been passed to the US for approval while Wilson
assured Johnson that "I cannot see that there is any change in your
basic position that I could urge on you." The myth in Iraq that
Britain is not complicit in US brutalities has its precedent in
Vietnam. Declassified files show that, in 1962, Britain covertly sent
an SAS team to south Vietnam under "temporary civilian status", to
help train soldiers of the dictatorial regime of President Diem.
Britain secretly provided arms and intelligence support to the US to
improve US bombing.
Moreover, brutal US "counter-insurgency" programmes were based on
prototypes developed by British advisers. Britain's "Delta Plan" for
the south Vietnamese regime, described by the Foreign Office as
intended "to dominate, control and win over the population" in rural
areas, became the US "strategic hamlets" programme, which forced
millions of Vietnamese peasants into fortified villages that resembled
concentration camps.
As in Iraq, the publicly proclaimed search for peace was largely a
charade. A senior Foreign Office official wrote in 1965: "The
government are fighting a continuous rearguard action to preserve
British diplomatic support for American policy in Vietnam. They can
only get away with this by constantly emphasising that our objective,
and that of the Americans, is a negotiated settlement".
These episodes highlight the gulf between what ministers have told the
public and what they have understood to be the case in private. The
declassified secret files point to some harsh truths about current
policy in Iraq: that the war is not about what our leaders say it is
(democracy), is not primarily against who they say it is (terrorists)
and is not being conducted for whom they say it is (Iraqis).
Iraqis are in practice regarded as "unpeople" whose deaths matter
little in the pursuit of western power; the major block on committing
atrocities is the fear of being exposed and ministers will do all they
can to cover them up. The public is the major threat to their
strategy, which explains why they resort to public deception
campaigns. If, as must be expected, atrocities now multiply in Iraq -
with Britain complicit - we cannot claim we were not warned.
Mark Curtis' new book, Unpeople: Britain's Secret Human Rights Abuses,
is published next month by Vintage.
ยฉ 2004 Guardian Newspapers, Ltd.