"John Hardt" <[email hidden]> wrote in news:pmqAf.31863$PY6.26907
@tornado.ohiordc.rr.com:
Quoted message said:The connection? Simple; the connection is that in 1996, someone
rationalized that they THOUGHT a particular item posed no risk.
Oxygen generators were known to produce dangerous amount of heat when set
off and if I remember correctly, were not supposed to have been
transported in the manner that they were on that flight. They weren't O2
cannisters, they were chemical packages that generate oxygen (and heat as
a byproduct) when set off. So they ended up with way too much heat and
oxygen together in the hold. You are right in the sense that someone
thought it would be safe regardless of posted policies and procedures,
but the oxygen generators were a known fire threat, which certainly is
not true of CO2 cartridges. The reason CO2 cartridges are banned is that
you could make a nasty little explosive with one and it wouldn't look any
different than a regular CO2 cartridge with the detection devices
currently in use at our airports.
You shouldn't avoid taking CO2 cartidges on a flight because they might
explode, you should avoid it because you might end up in the basement of
the airport with some big dude from the TSA doing a cavity search on you
for weapons and explosives.
The NTSB reporton the Miami crash:
Accident description
Status: Final
Date: 11 MAY 1996
Time: 14:25 ET
Type: McDonnell Douglas DC-9-32
Operator: ValuJet Airlines
Registration: N904VJ
Msn / C/n: 47377/496
Year built: 1969
Total airframe hrs: 68395 hours
Cycles: 80663 cycles
Engines: 2 Pratt & Whitney JT8D-7B
Crew: 5 fatalities / 5 on board
Passengers: 105 fatalities / 105 on board
Total: 110 fatalities / 110 on board
Airplane damage: Written off
Location: Everglades, FL (United States of America)
Phase: En route (ENR)
Nature: Domestic Scheduled Passenger
Departure airport: Miami International Airport, FL (MIA)
Destination airport: Atlanta-William B. Hartsfield International Airport,
GA (ATL)
Flightnumber: 592
Narrative:
ValuJet Flight 592 took off from Miami runway 09L at 14:04 for a flight
to Atlanta. At 14:10, while flying at 10628 feet at 232 knots IAS
(heading 300 ) the altitude dropped 815 feet and the IAS decreased 34
knots in 3 seconds time. From then on, the FDR recorded intermittent data
dropouts.
Shortly thereafter the crew requested to return to Miami due to smoke in
the cockpit. Flight 592 was vectored for a runway 12 approach. At 7207
feet, descending at 260 knots on a 210 heading, the FDR stopped
recording. Fifty seconds later ValuJet 592 struck a swamp with the nose
pitched down 75-80 and disintegrated.
It was concluded that there had been a very intense fire in the middle of
the forward cargo hold, which burned through the cabin floor at seat rows
5 and 6 on the left hand side.
Investigations focus on a fire, possibly caused by oxygen generators
carried in the cargo hold. The aircraft carried boxes containing 144
oxygen canisters and two MD-80 main wheel tires in the forward hold.
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The National Transportation Safety Board determines that
the probable causes of the accident, resulting in a fire in the Class D
cargo compartment from the actuation of one or more oxygen generators
improperly carried as cargo, were: (1) the failure of SabreTech to
properly prepare, package, identify, and track unexpended chemical oxygen
generators before presenting them to ValuJet for carriage; (2) the
failure of ValuJet to properly oversee its contract maintenance program
to ensure compliance with maintenance, maintenance training, and
hazardous materials requirements and practices; and (3) the failure of
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to require smoke detection and fire
suppression systems in Class D cargo compartments.
Contributing to the accident was the failure of the FAA to adequately
monitor ValuJet's heavy maintenance program and responsibilities,
including ValuJet's oversight of its contractors, and SabreTech's repair
station certificate; the failure of the FAA to adequately respond to
prior chemical oxygen generator fires with programs to address the
potential hazards; and the failure of ValuJet to ensure that both ValuJet
and contract maintenance employees were aware of the carrier's no-carry
hazardous materials policy and had received appropriate hazardous
materials training." (NTSB/AAR-97/06)