Exposing the Naturalistic Fallacy

"Michael Ragland" <[email hidden]> wrote in message

Quoted message said:

One is known as the naturalistic fallacy. There is a strong belief among late 20th century
Americans that if something can be shown to be "natural" then it is right and should be this way.

Note that this fallacy is also committed by those who buy "natural medicines" or similar products.

Quoted message said:

There are some other criticisms of sociobiology that Alcock does not address. Here I quote
extensively from R. Lewontin (1984), Not in our genes. "The conventional description of human
nature in sociobiological writing means that sociobiologists have failed to confront the
fundamental problems of the description of behavior. They treat categories like slavery,
entrepreneurship, dominance, aggression, tribalism and territoriality as if they were natural
objects having a concrete reality, rather than realizing that these are historically and
ideologically conditioned constructs.

"Not in Our Genes" is notorious as a weak attack on sociobiology. All words except those referring
to concrete objects are to some extent historically and ideologically conditioned constructs. We
need a word to describe ants who take larvae of related species and use them as labourers, and "slave-
making ants" is a natural analogy to make. However every entomologist knows that there are important
difference between slavery in ants and slavery in humans.

Quoted message said:

First, sociobiology uses arbitrary agglomeration." In our language, this is the problem of knowing
what a trait is or of knowing what decision is controlling a particular pattern of behavior like a
mating system or social structure. This is as much a problem for animal behavior as for
sociobiology -- but if you have trouble doing this for other species you surely will have trouble
with humans.

No behaviour (except the knee-jerk relex) is completely understood. Agglomeration is not arbitrary -
for instance we agglomerate all examples of eating behaviour. However, in humans, eating socially
may have important differences from eating through hunger. Since we don't understand what these
differences are, it makes sense to treat "eating" as a category.

Quoted message said:

"The second error of description is the confusion of metaphysical categories with concrete
objects...it cannot be assumed that any behavior or institution to which a name can be given is a
real thing subject to the laws of nature." In other words, how can you talk about war, religion or
slavery as a real trait?

Because humans have words for these things, and use them successfully. It cannot be that "war",
"religion" and "slavery" are applied to any and arbitrary social situations. They have some reality,
even if we don't know what the material substrate is.

Quoted message said:

"Sociobiologists commit the classical error of reification by taking concepts that have been
created as a way of ordering, understanding and talking about human social experience and endowing
these with a life of their own." When we apply these terms to animals, we understand that they are
metaphors. The behavior just sort of looks like the human phenomenon, like rape in ducks

Lewontin is confusing "metaphor" (use of one term to describe something which it resembles in one
aspect, such as "key" for "crucial"😉 with the extension of meaning - for instance use of the term
"professional" to refer to any well-paid employee. Use of the term "rape" to include actions by

interaction to ducks.

Quoted message said:

"The final problem of description" that Lewontin identifies, "closely related to the use of
metaphor, is the conflation of different phenomena under the same rubric. The classic that
preoccupies sociobiologists and their predecessors is aggression.

Since we don't understand behaviour, we don't know how it should be divided up. For instance Lorenz
was probably right to distinguish "aggression" from feeding in carnivores. Aggressive acts have
sufficient in common to make it reasonable to treat them as the same, until someone shows how
chimpanzee battles are inherently different from human gang warfare.

Quoted message said:

Throughout history, warfare, representing only the most organized technique of aggression, has
been endemic to every form of society, from hunter-gatherer bands to industrial states.

Wilson is arguably committing Lewontin's error 4 here. We don't know that hunter-gatherer skirmishes
actually have anything much in common with industrialised warfare. However we don't know that they
are different, either.

Quoted message said:

The differences in reproductive success are greater among men than among women, and are more
strongly correlated with social status. Men, but not women -- young men above all -- have powerful
incentives to fight for that status.

This can legitmately be attacked as a "just so" story (not one of Lewontin's errors). This is a
plausible evolutionary explanation of something, which is almost impossible to back up with hard
evidence. You could also argue that women have a violence inhibitor to prevent them from hurting
their babies.

Quoted message said:

Like the Jewish dietary laws, incest avoidance is cultural. It is also adaptive. However, it goes
further in being universal and therefore suggesting genetic predispositions."

Failure to see that "incest" is a cultural construct? Except that it isn't - it can be precisely
defined, and we also know the genetic reason underlying incest avoidance (harmful recessives), and
the proximate mechanism - don't mate with those you grew with as children.

Quoted message said:

"Daly's and Wilson's detailed analysis finds that, on the contrary, infanticide fits well with the
evolved inclinations that we would expect in the allocation of scarce parental resources.

Can't see a fallacy here. The mistake was made by the sociologists who didn't distinguish between
a natural and a step-father. They were applying a social construct (step-families) to a
biological category.

Quoted message said:

In such cases aggression is said to be a "density-dependent factor: in controlling population
growth. As it gradually increases in intensity, it operates like a tightening valve to slow and
finally shut off the increase in numbers.

Looks like Wilson has slipped into group selection in this quote. Aggression may become more or less
adaptive as density increases. Obviously there is no point in fighting for control of resources that
are lying around in abundance. On the other hand, an aggrressive individual may survive if he
initiates one or two fights in a sparse population, but quickly be killed if he tries ten or twenty
fights in a dense population.

[email hidden] (Michael Ragland) wrote in message news:<[email hidden]>...

Quoted message said:

I thought this was a fair criticism of sociobiology. Without necessarily discrediting sociobiology
the author mentions four specific sorts of error describtion sociobiology often employs. In
addition, the Naturalistic Fallacy is extremely important to understand. Just because something is
natural doesn't necessarily mean it is right or should be that way i.e. is biologically adaptive.

Michael Ragland

[big snip of the criticism of sociobiology Michael is describing]

The term "Naturalistic Fallacy" comes from the philosopher G.E.Moore, but the original argument
against it was in David Hume's "Human Nature". I believe that it is a delicious example of Hume's
writing, and for those who are interested, here is the entire passage:

I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some
importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd,
that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being
of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find,
that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition
that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is,
however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or
affirmation, `tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a
reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a
deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use
this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small
attention wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of
vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason.

I might point out that Mr. Ragland seems to commit the Naturalistic Fallacy himself in writing
"...it is right or should be that way
i.e. is biologically adaptive." But, probably Michael is using "adaptive" as an "ought" word, rather
than an "is" word.

Ethicists since Hume have had to deal with the issue, "If you can't get 'ought' from 'is', where the
hell do you get it?". Moore's answer is just, well, laughable. Most philosophers seem to follow Hume
in deriving "ought" from "what I want" in some sense, with some balance being restored by giving
equal weight to "what you want".

Personally, I don't know where "ought" comes from, but if "ought" is found to live at all close to
"cannot be", then there must be a mistake somewhere. IMO.

"Malcolm" <[email hidden]> wrote in message news:<[email hidden]>...

Quoted message said:

Quoted message said:

[quoting Barash] Like the Jewish dietary laws, incest avoidance is cultural. It is also
adaptive. However, it goes further in being universal and therefore suggesting genetic
predispositions."

Failure to see that "incest" is a cultural construct? Except that it isn't - it can be precisely
defined, and we also know the genetic reason underlying incest avoidance (harmful recessives), and
the proximate mechanism - don't mate with those you grew with as children.

Barash's claim that incest is a cultural construct is perhaps best understood as a claim that
different cultures place different rules on just what kinds of contacts with whom are "tabu". And,
my reading of the anthropological literature tells me he is absolutely right.

YOUR ability to define incest precisely is irrelevant if your definition does not agree with that
adopted by another culture.

In defense of my reading of Barash, note that the Jewish dietary laws are also seen as generally
adaptive, though somewhat arbitrary and occasionally dead wrong in detail.

I believe that the "cultural construct" criticism of sociobiology is mostly that anthropologically
uninformed sociobiologists too frequently try to "explain" things that they observe in their own
culture and then assume that they are explaining a fact of human nature. Or, at least I believe that
THAT PART of the criticism has some validity.

Other than that quibble, I mostly agree with your critique of the anti-sociobiologists.

Jim Menegay said:

The term "Naturalistic Fallacy" comes from the philosopher G.E.Moore, but the original argument
against it was in David Hume's "Human Nature". I believe that it is a delicious example of Hume's
writing, and for those who are interested, here is the entire passage:

Compared to Hume, who was as much a psychical scientist as a philosopher IMHO (an introspectionist
par excellent), some might argue that the past seventy five years of controlled and quantifiable
observations and experiments (behaviorism - yuk) haven't been all that helpful:

"Discussions of scientific method have tended to stress problems of testability, while
neglecting...those aspects of the universe which in some sense are most central and significant
for the area of reality with which the science deals." "It has been frequently assumed that only
those events which in principle can be simultaneously observed by multiple observers ... are to
be accepted as constituting a legitimate observational basis for science." "I am suggesting that
the more general and, to me, acceptable, objective intended by the criterion of interobserver
agreement would be...the criterion of repeatability....a more general trust in one's own
experience" ...and the abandonment of "a corresponding uncritical acceptance of the significance
of verbal reports." (Karl Zener)

[Hume quote]

Quoted message said:

I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some
importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd,
that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the
being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd
to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no
proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible;
but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new
relation or affirmation, `tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same
time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new
relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do
not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am
persuaded, that this small attention wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us
see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects,
nor is perceiv'd by reason.

Having spent some thirty years reflecting on the nature of rationality it should come as no surprise
that I have a few humble thoughts of my own to offer on this matter:

'Ought' reflects one's faith that X is about to happen based on one of two types of causal
hypothese:

1. run of the mill causation (The light 'ought' to illuminate once I throw this switch).
2. rational agent causation (One 'ought' to balance immediate concerns with future concerns).

There are probably other types of 'oughts' but these are the two basic one's for the type of
considerations Hume was focusing on.

Quoted message said:

I might point out that Mr. Ragland seems to commit the Naturalistic Fallacy himself in writing
"...it is right or should be that way
i.e. is biologically adaptive." But, probably Michael is using "adaptive" as an "ought" word,
rather than an "is" word.

Special concern for one's own future would be selected by evolution: Animals without such concern
would be more likely to die before passing on their genes. Such concern would remain, as a
natural fact, even if we decided that it was not justified. By thinking hard about the arguments,
we might be able briefly to stun this natural concern. But it would soon revive... The fact that
we have this attitude cannot therefore be a reason for thinking it justified. Whether it is
justified [i.e. rational] is an open question, waiting to be answered (Derek Parfit, 'Reasons and
Persons'😉.

Quoted message said:

Ethicists since Hume have had to deal with the issue, "If you can't get 'ought' from 'is', where
the hell do you get it?".

Here's my response to a similar question raised in another discussion group:

*************************************************************

"Hill, David" wrote:

[snipped]

Quoted message said:

...Between "ought" claims and ordinary value judgments there is at least as much of a logical gap
as any between is's and oughts.

[snipped]

Quoted message said:

....If someone could derive significant moral conclusions from factual descriptions, plus an
appropriate functional analysis of a Darwinian sort, plus a few unchallenged axioms, that would
be worth doing, however you characterize the several sorts of premises involved.

In an earlier post I offered a formula for deriving a prudential 'ought' from an epistemic 'is'. I
think it might be helpful to attempt the same thing again for a moral ought, and then go back and
take a look at what sort of premises underlie that ought.

3. Assume that 'being rational' is NOT a matter of 'being efficient' (means/end theory) 'being
logical' (computationalism) 'being self-interested' (egoism) 'being happy' (pragmatism) 'being
strategically logical (game theory) 'following a universalizable maxim (Kant) 'fulfilling one's
desires' (hedonism) 'maximizing global happiness' (utilitarianism) etc. but simply a matter of
'being able to "see" what is going on' [non-formalizable] with the metaphor unpacked to 'being
rational' = 'being objective', not only cognitively, BUT VALUATIVELY AS WELL.

4. Corroborate the epistemic credentials (the "is" component of the ought derivation) of the above
"theory" in terms of its ability to maximize explanatory coherence better than any of its
competitors (means/end, egoism, etc.).

For example:

a. The theory can "explain", at least in a conceptual framework not available from the
perspective of competing theories, both the excessive altruism and the emotional instability
(volatility in self-worth) observable in [censored] sapiens, in that they can both be construed as
two different sides of the same valuative objectivity coin (an equalizing of value between
the interests of others and one's self). Since in the above theory, rationality correlates
with valuative objectivity, [censored] sapiens would be construed as having become MORE RATIONAL
than the predicted norm (ruthless selfishness). While this doesn't offer us an immediate
causal account of the anomalies in question (altruism and emotional instability), it
certainly offers one a new conceptual framework for thinking about them which, in turn,
might lead to an improved causal account (e.g., they are maladaptive byproducts of the
evolution of rationality).

b. The theory can shed new light on a number of rationality paradoxes such as Newcomb's
Problem, Prisoner's Dilemma, etc., in that all such paradoxes stem from the assumption that
rationality is a strategic attribute

c. The theory can circumvent the logical paradoxes of rational irrationality, similar to the
example offered by Derek Parfit on page 12 of 'Reasons and Persons'.

d. The theory can explain the chaos of the Cohen symposium on rationality ('The Behavioral and
Brain Sciences', 1981, 4, 317-370) by sharpening the distinction between logic and reasoning
(I wouldn't go into this here).

e. The theory can offer intersubjectively reproducible empirical evidence (feelings of
worthlessness) that mother nature's most rational species is beginning to show signs of
"standing outside the system" (Lucas) corroborating the Lucas and Penrose position on the
implications of Godel's incompleteness theorem (i.e., minds are not machines). (again a bit
too complex an issue for explanation in this particular post).

f. The theory is compatible with what is the currently accepted paradigm for practical
rationality, the 'equal weight' criterion, albeit extended beyond the periphery of
self-interest:

My feelings a year hence should be just as important to me as my feelings next minute, if
only I could make an equally sure forecast of them. Indeed this equal and impartial
concern for all parts of one's conscious life is perhaps the most prominent element in the
common notion of the _rational_. (Henry Sidgwick, 'The Methods of Ethics'😉.

All these theories [of rational self-interest] also claim that, in deciding what would be
best for someone, we should give equal weight to all the parts of this person's future.
Later events may be less predictable; and a predictable event should count for less if it
is less likely to happen. But it should not count for less merely because, if it happens,
it will happen later (Derek Parfit, 'Reasons and Persons'😉.

3. Derive the 'ought' component via the syllogism:

PERMISE: 'Given that one chooses to be rational, CONNECTIVE then MORAL MAXIM: one ought to
'Love (value) their neighbor as they love (value) themself'.

Notice that this moral maxim does not contain any values in the maxim itself. It merely states,
given that one values X such and such an amount, then one ought to value Y such and such an
amount. But that does not mean that the ought doesn't have underlying premises. Indeed, it would
seem to have both a cognitive AND a valuative premise. The cognitive premise is that the
underlying theory of rationality is "true", and the valuative premise is that the individual in
question values rationality. And guess what? I don't think this is actually MY theory of
rationality, in that I suspect the maxim itself rings a bell in just about anyone capable of
reflective thought.

My conclusion then. Moral oughts are entailments of an implicit theory of rationality we humans
have been subconsciously entertaining for the past several thousand years (as evidenced by the
widespread acceptance of the moral maxim) and as such is entailed by the implicit cognitive
premise that our shared theory of rationality is "true" and the shared valuative premise that
rationality is itself of intrinsic worth, or at least of sufficient worth to warrant that humans
will often sacrifice their well-being, and at times their very lives (e.g., self-incinerating
Buddhist monks) in the pursuit of moral objectives.

*************************************************************

Quoted message said:

Moore's answer is just, well, laughable.

Can't remember what it was. A little refresher would be nice.

Quoted message said:

Most philosophers seem to follow Hume in deriving "ought" from "what I want" in some sense, with
some balance being restored by giving equal weight to "what you want".

In the paper below I disprove Hume's emotivist theory using Hume's observations on the manner in
which association "facilitates the sympathy" while at the same time offering an explanation for the
evolution of morality, or at least of the "red-shift" in our species valuative profile relative to
the "ruthless selfishness" (Dawkins) predicted by our formal models.

Quoted message said:

Personally, I don't know where "ought" comes from, but if "ought" is found to live at all close to
"cannot be", then there must be a mistake somewhere. IMO.

All causal hypothese could be wrong, because rationality is forever beyond our grasp in its
totality. All there are in the finite world are theories that are more or less rational. Both Hume
and Kant got this wrong by the way. Reasonable is the aim of science these days, not certainty,
IMHO. This follows from the conclusion SUGGESTED by Godel's theorem that rationality can not be
formalized.

PR

PS. Should anyone express an interest, I would be happy to offer an explantion for why we, as
naturally selected organisms, 'ought' to be moral in the full blown sense of 'Love thy neighbor
as you love yourself'. Notice this is not some variation on the [censored] for tat, social contract
[censored] that people assume can be employed to circumvent Dawkins conclusion.

"Michael Ragland" <[email hidden]> wrote in message

One is known as the naturalistic fallacy. There is a strong belief among late 20th century Americans
that if something can be shown to be "natural" then it is right and should be this way.

Malcom: Note that this fallacy is also committed by those who buy "natural medicines" or
similar products.

MR:Quite so. I don't buy natural products🙂 Seriously, I think the point made was a general point
and that is not everything shown to be natural is right and should be this way. Conversely, it
doesn't mean everything shown to be natural is wrong and should not be this way. I was thinking
of our genes when I read this statement, not natural medicines.

There are some other criticisms of sociobiology that Alcock does not address. Here I quote
extensively from R. Lewontin (1984), Not in our genes. "The conventional description of human nature
in sociobiological writing means that sociobiologists have failed to confront the fundamental
problems of the description of behavior. They treat categories like slavery, entrepreneurship,
dominance, aggression, tribalism and territoriality as if they were natural objects having a
concrete reality, rather than realizing that these are historically and ideologically conditioned
constructs.

Malcom: "Not in Our Genes" is notorious as a weak attack on sociobiology. All words except those
referring to concrete objects are to some extent historically and ideologically conditioned
constructs. We need a word to describe ants who take larvae of related species and use them as
labourers, and "slave-making ants" is a natural analogy to make. However every entomologist knows
that there are important difference between slavery in ants and slavery in humans.

MS:I agree and I don't subscribe to "Not in Our Genes". I do believe, however, Lewontin's
statement, "The conventional description of human nature in sociobiological writing means that
sociobiologists have failed to confront the fundamental problems of the description of behavior.
They treat categories like slavery, entrepreneurship, dominance, aggression, tribalism and
territoriality as if they were natural objects having a concrete reality, rather than realizing
that these are historically and ideologically conditioned constructs" has some validity, not
because its not in our genes but because it is in our genes and we have insufficient knowledge
of being able to confront the fundamental problems of the describtion of behavior. You write,
"No behaviour (except the knee-jerk relex) is completely understood. Agglomeration is not
arbitrary - for instance we agglomerate all examples of eating behaviour. However, in humans,
eating socially may have important differences from eating through hunger. Since we don't
understand what these differences are, it makes sense to treat "eating" as a category. Yes,
you're right. Agglomeration is inevitable but as you point out just as we don't understand what
all the differences are between eating socially and eating through hunger and lump it into the
category "eating" we don't understand all the differences between aggression and war and may
lump it into the category "war".

The reason I posted this litle critique of sociobiology is because of concerns of it being exploited
to advance a politically reactionary agenda. I happen to think sociobiology is a valid discipline
and has contributed to a better understanding of human nature. There is, however, a real danger. If
what truly subscribes to many of the basic tenets of sociobiology then one is ultimately confronted
with our evolutionary biology, our Darwinian evolution and one is left with two choices. One is we
can go on being the aggressive animal we are and engaging in killing or we can see the necessity of
genetically engineering ourselves so that we less fit the picture sociobiology paints of us. I take
the latter position. Darwinian evolution moves very slowly and the human species will have long
destroyed itself if it waits for Darwinian evolution to similarly accomplish what genetic
engineering could do much more quicker and efficiently. Of course, genetic engineeering is in its
infancy. The danger of sociobiology is there are those who might increasingly grasp on to it and
declare boldly, "This is the way human nature is! Don't thwart it, express it!" This is bound to
happen anyway but I don't like to see scientific disciplines being exploited for political
agendas..as inevitable as that is.

First, sociobiology uses arbitrary agglomeration." In our language, this is the problem of knowing
what a trait is or of knowing what decision is controlling a particular pattern of behavior like a
mating system or social structure. This is as much a problem for animal behavior as for sociobiology
-- but if you have trouble doing this for other species you surely will have trouble with humans.

No behaviour (except the knee-jerk relex) is completely understood. Agglomeration is not arbitrary -
for instance we agglomerate all examples of eating behaviour. However, in humans, eating socially
may have important differences from eating through hunger. Since we don't understand what these
differences are, it makes sense to treat "eating" as a category.

"The second error of description is the confusion of metaphysical categories with concrete
objects...it cannot be assumed that any behavior or institution to which a name can be given is a
real thing subject to the laws of nature." In other words, how can you talk about war, religion or
slavery as a real trait?

Malcom: Because humans have words for these things, and use them successfully. It cannot be that
"war", "religion" and "slavery" are applied to any and arbitrary social situations. They have some
reality, even if we don't know what the material substrate is.

MT:Of course they have reality even if we don't know what the material substrate is. I thought the
relevant point, however, is that we don't know the material substrate for them. I disagree with
the statement these things are not subject to the laws of nature but nor can we describe them as
a real trait. War, religion and slavery are metaphysical categories. They exist and have reality
but they can't be described as traits. Again, part of the problem is agglomeration. If the human
species survives for another thousand years I think one will see science increasingly taking
control. Metaphysical categories which are "ideologically" and "historically" rooted will
gradually vanish as science more and more is able to discover and manipulate the material
substrate of things.

"Sociobiologists commit the classical error of reification by taking concepts that have been created
as a way of ordering, understanding and talking about human social experience and endowing these
with a life of their own." When we apply these terms to animals, we understand that they are
metaphors. The behavior just sort of looks like the human phenomenon, like rape in ducks

Malcom: Lewontin is confusing "metaphor" (use of one term to describe something which it resembles
in one aspect, such as "key" for "crucial"😉 with the extension of meaning - for instance use of the
term "professional" to refer to any well-paid employee. Use of the term "rape" to include actions by
mallard ducks is an extension of the meaning from purely

MU:Sounds like another definition of metaphor to me.

"The final problem of description" that Lewontin identifies, "closely related to the use of
metaphor, is the conflation of different phenomena under the same rubric. The classic that
preoccupies sociobiologists and their predecessors is aggression.

Malcom: Since we don't understand behaviour, we don't know how it should be divided up. For instance
Lorenz was probably right to distinguish "aggression" from feeding in carnivores. Aggressive acts
have sufficient in common to make it reasonable to treat them as the same, until someone shows how
chimpanzee battles are inherently different from human gang warfare.

MV:Well with all the research being done on aggression I think the conflation of different phenomena
under one rubric will gradually unravel. As science learns more eventually it will be able to
construct a new rubric for aggression, one increasingly guided by intelligent design. Yes, I
agree with you that currently it is necessary (but hardly sufficient) to treat aggressive acts
commonly until someone shows how chimpanzee battles are inherently different from gang warfare.

Throughout history, warfare, representing only the most organized technique of aggression, has been
endemic to every form of society, from hunter-gatherer bands to industrial states.

Malcom: Wilson is arguably committing Lewontin's error 4 here. We don't know that hunter-gatherer
skirmishes actually have anything much in common with industrialised warfare. However we don't know
that they are different, either.

MW:Our DNA has changed very little since the time we were hunter gatherers to the present industrial
state of civilization. The changes which have occurred have been cultural i.e. scientific and
technological developments. Obviously cultural evolution has produced striking changes between
hunter gather skirmishes and industrialized warfare but genetically (not phenotypically) we
remain essentially the same.

The differences in reproductive success are greater among men than among women, and are more
strongly correlated with social status. Men, but not women -- young men above all -- have powerful
incentives to fight for that status.

Malcom: This can legitmately be attacked as a "just so" story (not one of Lewontin's errors). This
is a plausible evolutionary explanation of something, which is almost impossible to back up with
hard evidence. You could also argue that women have a violence inhibitor to prevent them from
hurting their babies.

MX:I don't think this is a "just so" story. I think there is probably a wealth of evidence to back
it up. Do you think Darwin's Origin of the Species was a "just so" story?

Like the Jewish dietary laws, incest avoidance is cultural. It is also adaptive. However, it goes
further in being universal and therefore suggesting genetic predispositions."

Malcom: Failure to see that "incest" is a cultural construct? Except that it isn't - it can be
precisely defined, and we also know the genetic reason underlying incest avoidance (harmful
recessives), and the proximate mechanism - don't mate with those you grew with as children.
MY:Incest taboo does have a cultural component to it. For example, I believe the ancient Hawaiians
allowed for more secondary inbreeding with relatives than other cultures.

"Daly's and Wilson's detailed analysis finds that, on the contrary, infanticide fits well with the
evolved inclinations that we would expect in the allocation of scarce parental resources.

Malcom: Can't see a fallacy here. The mistake was made by the sociologists who didn't distinguish
between a natural and a step-father. They were applying a social construct (step-families) to a
biological category.

MZ:I'm not aware Daly and Wilson's analysis involved step-fathers. Do you have a reference?

In such cases aggression is said to be a "density-dependent factor: in controlling population
growth. As it gradually increases in intensity, it operates like a tightening valve to slow and
finally shut off the increase in numbers.

Malcom: Looks like Wilson has slipped into group selection in this quote. Aggression may become more
or less adaptive as density increases. Obviously there is no point in fighting for control of
resources that are lying around in abundance. On the other hand, an aggrressive individual may
survive if he initiates one or two fights in a sparse population, but quickly be killed if he tries
ten or twenty fights in a dense population.

MZ:I was thinking of Malthus here. As a population increases resouces become more scarce and this
leads to natural selection.

Michael Ragland said:

MR:I thought this was a fair criticism of sociobiology. Without necessarily discrediting
sociobiology the author mentions four specific sorts of error describtion sociobiology often
employs. In addition, the Naturalistic Fallacy is extremely important to understand. Just
because something is natural doesn't necessarily mean it is right or should be that way i.e. is
biologically adaptive.

In my opinion, the most important result of formalizing natural selection has been the discovery on
the part of the more astute of its practitioners that the explanatory void between the theory of
natural selection and human nature is even greater and more enigmatic than previously imagined.
Dawkins has the rare gift of being able to be blunt and honest, not only about the virtues of the
theory, but also with regard to its shortcomings
(i.e., the need for a memetics to fill the void):

As an enthusiastic Darwinian, I have been dissatisfied with explanations which my fellow-
enthusiasts have offered for human behaviour. They have tried to look for 'biological advantages'
in various attributes of human civilization. For instance, tribla religion has been seen as a
mechanisms for solidifying group identity, valuable for a pack-hunting species whose individuals
rely on cooperation to catch large and fast prey... These ideas are plausible as far as they go,
but I find they do not begin to square up to the formidable challenge of explaining culture,
cultural evolution, and the immense differences between human cultures around the world...
(Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, p. 205).

Quoted message said:

MR:I'd like to think my 'concerns' and 'hopes' go beyond the Darwinian imperative of passing on my
genes.

I agree. Now if someone could just explain why?

'Give me liberty or give me death' (Nathan Hale)

'I would gladly give up my life for one brief moment of greatness' (Sigmund Freud).

Quoted message said:

I understand your general point but it is not applicable to my statement, "Just because
something is natural doesn't necessarily mean it is right or should be that way i.e. is
biologically adaptive. I'm referring to Darwinian evolution. Mr. Menegay is correct I'm using
adaptive as an 'ought' word and not an 'is' word. That is a topic in itself but I wanted to
confirm that. You write,

But remember, there are two types of 'oughts', garden variety causal 'oughts' (given how natural
selection operates, we 'ought' to be "ruthlessly selfish"😉 and rational agent 'oughts' (one 'ought'
to love (value) their neighbor as they love (value) themself). The fact that what they mandate are
exact opposites is what makes the matter so fascinating and at least part of why I assume Prof
Dawkins has introduced the term 'meme' to act as a placemarker to remind us of the huge explanatory
void that is yet to be filled.

Unlike [Lorentz and Montagu], I think 'nature red in tooth and claw' sums up our modern
understanding of natural selection admirably. (Dawkins).

Quoted message said:

Ethicists since Hume have had to deal with the issue, "If you can't get 'ought' from 'is', where
the hell do you get it?".

Moral 'oughts' are entailments of an implicit theory of rationality we humans have been
subconsciously entertaining for the past several thousand years. We already understand that the
amount of value nature would like us to attach to ourselves is rationally inordinate and that a
rational creature is simply one that is valuatively objective. Its the same quality we are looking
for in jurors when we decide not to allow O. J.'s relative to sit on the jury. We want jurors who
will be as rational (valuatively objective) as possible.

The reason why some of us strive to be moral is for emotional well-being. We are all striving to
justify our existence due to the fact that nature has allowed us to become just a little too
rational for our own good. We know longer survive automatically, but are increasingly in need of
REASONS for doing so.

Quoted message said:

I think questions of whether natural selection is justified or rational is interesting. Looking
strictly at the mechanism of natural selection itself I think questioning whether it is justified
or irrational is moot.

Nature has EMPLOYED rationality in one of her species to achieve her strategic end. Unfortunately,
too many assume that the end itself must therefore be rational.

Quoted message said:

Unlike the past, we can't continue to rely on natural selection. Why? Because natural selection
from a 'moral' standpoint is savage and entails war.

Agreed. Its both amoral and arational. But WE are not. Explain why is what I think a memetics should
be all about.

Quoted message said:

MR:If I read the post correctly you responded to David Hill's statement, " If someone could derive
significant moral conclusions from factual descriptions, plus an appropriate functional
analysis of a Darwinian sort, plus a few unchallenged axioms, that would be worth doing,
however you characterize the several sorts of premises involved." I don't think there are any
unchallenged axioms🙂 I think you really fail in including a functional analysis of a Darwinian
sort here.

Absolutely. My purpose was merely to show you how to derive a moral 'ought' from an epistemic 'is'.
You do this by demonstrating that some given theory of rationality is epistemically superior to any
of its competitors. You bring the mountain to Mohammed so to speak, with the requirements of the
theory automatically epistemically justified and therefore strategically required given that one
chooses to be rational.

Quoted message said:

If you include such an analysis I think your conclusions fall apart.

A agree that the causal 'ought' of natural selection ("ruthless selfishness"😉 is the exact opposite
of the 'ought' of rationality/ morality (love others as you love yourself). I have not yet presented
you with my explanation for their resolution, although your skepticism on the matter is certainly
justified given that they are indeed the exact opposite of each other.

Quoted message said:

You state the moral maxim one ought to 'Love (value) their neighbor as they love (value)
themself'. Yes, this moral maxim has existed for thousands of years. I see no evidence, however,
of it being widely 'accepted' if one means adhered to.

Me neither. I'm not saying any of us ADHERE to the maxim, merely that most of us ACCEPT it as a
worthy or noble ideal.

Quoted message said:

I don't particularly care for Richard Dawkins but he did make the comment I believe (as others
have) that nature is red in tooth and claw. Darwinian evolution is contrary to the moral maxim.

Yep. The exact opposite. Why do you think guys like me get so frustrated when we see the
conclusions of Dawkins, Price, Hamilton, Smith, Campbell watered down to make the antagonism appear
a little less disturbing. We do not adhere to the ideal, but we do at least APPROXIMATE it to a far
greater degree than other species. Now if someone could just explain why (memetics) I think we'd be
all set, eh? 🙂

Even with qualifications regarding the possibility of group selection, the portrait of the
biologically based social personality that emerges is one of predominantly self-serving
opportunism EVEN FOR THE MOST SOCIAL SPECIES, for all species in which there is genetic
competition among the social co- operators, that is, where all members have the chance of
parenthood (Donald Campbell).

Quoted message said:

Self-incinerating Buddhist monks are the exception, not the rule. Did you arrive here in a time
machine from the Age of Enlightenment? One of the mistakes Enlightment thinkers made was they
placed too much 'faith' in human reason. In less than two centuries Europe went from the Age of
Enlightment to the two world wars and the Holocaust. I'm not suggesting you abandon rationality
Mr. Roberts but I am suggesting you be more realistic in how extremely fragile it is in the world
and how little a role it plays in world affairs. That way if the ax comes to swing on your head at
least you'll be prepared.

I'm not advocating ANYTHING. You wanted to know how to derive a moral 'ought' from an epistemic
'is'. I've shown you how. The issue of why we humans more closely approximate the ideal than we
should given nature's incessant culling of the valuatively unfit (benevolent individuals) is what
yet needs to be explained, Mike. I haven't even started on that. One step at a time.

Quoted message said:

MR:I think science and rationality go together. I can't think of anything more 'rational' than
science.

Me neither. But its still far from rational in an ideal sense. Objectivity is a myth we teach our
children, but the demise of Newtonian mechanics has resulted in an infusion of intellectual humility
into the scientific enterprize. We STRIVE for epistemic objectivity in much the manner some of us
strive for valuative objectivity (the moral maxim). But that's far from suggesting any of us ever
achieve it.

Quoted message said:

PS. Should anyone express an interest, I would be happy to offer an explantion for why we, as
naturally selected organisms, 'ought' to be moral in the full blown sense of 'Love thy
neighbor as you love yourself'. Notice this is not some variation on the [censored] for tat, social
contract [censored] that people assume can be employed to circumvent Dawkins conclusion.

MR:That's a tall order.

You got that right. At the URL below I start with the bare bones mechanics. Should you want to
comment on it I would be glad to address your remarks.

I guess at its foundation is the supposition that 'an increase in cognitive objectivity (knowledge,
rationality, intelligence, wisdom, etc.) "facilitates" an increase in valuative objectivity
(impartiality, the moral maxim, etc.) IRRESPECTIVE of its adaptiveness. In the paper URL'd below I
offer evidence that a. the deviations from ruthless selfishness in our species predicted profile
have been cognitively induced and b. that at least some of this cognitively induced deviation is
maladaptive. But then that's another whole discussion. Thanks for your comments so far.

Quoted message said:

Mr. Roberts you can't have your cake and eat it too.

Not even if we view morality as a maladaptive by-product of the evolution of rationality?

PR

MR:
If I read the post correctly you responded to David Hill's statement, "
If someone could derive significant moral conclusions from factual
descriptions, plus an appropriate functional analysis of a Darwinian
sort, plus a few unchallenged axioms, that would be worth doing, however
you characterize the several sorts of premises involved." I don't think
there are any unchallenged axioms🙂 I think you really fail in including
a functional analysis of a Darwinian sort here.
Here goes:

A Sketch of a Divergent Theory of Emotional Instability

Objective: To account for self-worth related emotion (i.e., needs for love, acceptance, moral
integrity, recognition, achievement, purpose, meaning, etc.) and emotional disorder (e.g.,
depression, suicide, etc.) within the context of an evolutionary scenario; i.e., to synthesize
natural science and the humanities; i.e., to answer the question: 'Why is there a species of
naturally selected organism expending huge quantities of effort and energy on the survivalistically
bizarre non-physical objective of maximizing self-worth?'

"There is no value-judgment more important to man -- no factor more decisive in his
psychological development and motivation -- than the estimate he passes on himself. This
estimate is ordinarily experienced by him, not in the form of a conscious, verbalized
judgment, but in the form of a feeling, a feeling that can be hard to isolate and identify
because he experiences it constantly: it is part of every other feeling, it is involved in his
every emotional response. ... it is the single most significant key to his behavior."
(Nathaniel Branden).

Observation: The species in which rationality is most developed is also the one in which individuals
have the greatest difficulty in maintaining an adequate sense of self-worth, often going to
extraordinary lengths in doing so (e.g., Evel Knievel, celibate monks, self endangering
Greenpeacers, etc.).

Hypothesis: Rationality is antagonistic to psycho centric stability (i.e., maintaining an adequate
sense of self-worth).

Explanation #1: In much the manner reasoning allows for the subordination

to more global concerns (concern for the self as a whole), so too, these more global concerns
and values can themselves become reevaluated and subordinated to other more global, more
objective considerations. And if this is so, and assuming that emotional disorder emanates from
a deficiency in self-worth resulting from precisely this sort of experientially based
reevaluation, then it can reasonably be construed as a natural malfunction resulting from one's
rational faculties functioning a tad too well.

Explanation #2: Being the blind arational [censored] that she is, mother nature instills in all her
creatures a sense of their own importance (or of the importance of their needs) that is rationally
inordinate. And, as a species reaches a certain stage in its rational/ cultural/memetic
development, its members increasingly come to question this inordinancy, and increasingly come to
require reasons for maintaining it (needs for love, acceptance, moral integrity, purpose, meaning,
status, wealth, etc.).

"Special concern for one's own future would be selected by evolution: Animals without such
concern would be more likely to die before passing on their genes. Such concern would
remain, as a natural fact, even if we decided that it was not justified. By thinking hard
about the arguments, we might be able briefly to stun this natural concern. But it would
soon revive... The fact that we have this attitude cannot therefore be a reason for thinking
it justified. Whether it is justified [i.e. rational] is an open question, waiting to be
answered." (Derek Parfit)

Normalcy and Disorder: Assuming this is correct, then some explanation for the relative "normalcy"
of most individuals would seem necessary. This is accomplished simply by postulating different
levels or degrees of consciousness. From this perspective, emotional disorder would then be
construed as a valuative affliction resulting from an increase in semantic content in the engram
indexed by the linguistic expression, "I am insignificant", which all persons of common sense "know"
to be true, but which the "emotionally disturbed" have come to "realize", through abstract thought,
devaluing experience, etc.

Implications: So-called "free will" and the incessant activity presumed to emanate from it is simply
the insatiable appetite we all have for self-significating experience which, in turn, is simply
nature's way of attempting to counter the objectifying influences of our rational faculties. This
also implies that the engine in the first "free-thinking" artifact is probably going to be a diesel
(i.e., the cure produces more of the disease).

"Another simile would be an atomic pile of less than critical size: an injected idea is to
correspond to a neutron entering the pile from without. Each such neutron will cause a certain
disturbance which eventually dies away. If, however, the size of the pile is sufficiently
increased, the disturbance caused by such an incoming neutron will very likely go on and on
increasing until the whole pile is destroyed. Is there a corresponding phenomenon for minds?"
(A. M. Turing).

Additional Implications: Since the explanation I have proposed amounts to the contention that the
most rational species (presumably) is beginning to exhibit signs of transcending the formalism of
nature's fixed objective (accomplished in man via intentional self concern, i.e., the prudence
program) it can reasonably be construed as providing evidence and argumentation in support of Lucas
(1961) and Penrose (1989, 1994). Not only does this imply that the aforementioned artifact probably
won't be a computer, but it would also explain why a question such as "Can Human Irrationality Be
Experimentally Demonstrated?" (Cohen, 1981) has led to controversy, in that it presupposes the
possibility of a discrete (formalizable) answer to a question which can only be addressed in
comparative (non-formalizable) terms (e.g. X is more rational than Y, the norm, etc.). Along these
same lines, the theory can also be construed as an endorsement or metajustification for comparative
approaches in epistemology (explanationism, plausiblism, etc.)

"So even if mathematicians are superb cognizers of mathematical truth, and even if there is no
algorithm, practical or otherwise, for cognizing mathematical truth, it does not follow that the
power of mathematicians to cognize mathematical truth is not entirely explicable in terms of
their brain's executing an algorithm. Not an algorithm for intuiting mathematical truth -- we
can suppose that Penrose [via Godel] has proved that there could be no such thing. What would
the algorithm be for, then? Most plausibly it would be an algorithm -- one of very many -- for
trying to stay alive ... " (D. C. Dennett).

Oops! Sorry! Wrong again, old bean. [me again, in response to Dennett's claim]

"My ruling passion is the love of literary fame" (David Hume).

"I have often felt as though I had inherited all the defiance and all the passions with which our
ancestors defended their Temple and could gladly sacrifice my life for one great moment in
history" (Sigmund Freud).

"He, too [Ludwig Wittgenstein], suffered from depressions and for long periods considered
killing himself because he considered his life worthless, but the stubbornness inherited from
his father may have helped him to survive" (Hans Sluga).

"The inquest [Alan Turing's] established that it was suicide. The evidence was perfunctory, not
for any irregular reason, but because it was so transparently clear a case" (Andrew Hodges)

"Its not about the mountain. Its about what the mountain tells you about yourself"
(Edmund Hillary).

REFERENCES

1. Cohen, L. Jonathan, Can Human Irrationality be Experimentally Demonstrated?, The Behavioral and
Brain Sciences, 1981, 4, 317-370.

Reprinted in Anderson's, Minds and Machines, and engagingly explored in Hofstadter's Pulitzer
prize winner, Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid.

2. Penrose, Roger, The Emperor's New Mind, 1989; Shadows of the Mind, 1994.

Phil Roberts, Jr.

Why We Turned Out Like Captain Kirk Instead of Mr. Spock:
The Psychodynamics of Genetic Indeterminism
fortunecity.comKirk.htmOpen ↗

Michael Ragland said:

PR: In my opinion, the most important result of formalizing natural selection has been the
discovery on the part of the more astute of its practitioners that the explanatory void between
the theory of natural selection and human nature is even greater and more enigmatic than
previously imagined. Dawkins has the rare gift of being able to be blunt and honest, not only
about the virtues of the theory, but also with regard to its shortcomings (i.e., the need for a
memetics to fill the void):

Response: I see no explanatory void between the theory of natural selection and human nature.

But your the person who made the following remark:

Quoted message said:

MR: I'd like to think my 'concerns' and 'hopes' go beyond the Darwinian imperative of passing on
my genes.

and this:

Quoted message said:

In my case my hopes and concerns are for the continued survival of the human species. I realize
the way I would like to see reality is not the way reality is. Nevertheless, I think I have
something to contribute.

While these comments may seem rather mundane from the perspective of what we have come to expect
from our fellow humans, you seem blissfully ignorant of the fact that such noble motives are
currently incomprehensible from the perspective of the only viable hypothesis we have of the
processes that produced us:

[BEGIN QUOTES]

Be warned that if you wish, as I do, to build a society in which individuals cooperate
generously and unselfishly towards a common good, you can expect little help from biological
nature. Let us try to TEACH generosity and altruism, because WE ARE BORN SELFISH. Let us
understand what our selfish genes are upt to, because we may then at least have the chance
to UPSET THEIR DESIGNS, SOMETHING THAT NO OTHER SPECIES HAS EVER ASPIRED TO. (Dawkins)
[emphasis mine]

The identification of individuals as the unit of selection is a central theme in Darwin's
thought. This idea underliees his most radical claim: that evolution is purposeless and without
inherent direction. ... Evolution does not recognize the 'good' of the ecosystem' or even the
'GOOD OF THE SPECIES.' Any harmony or stability is only an indirect result of individuals
relentlessly pursuing their own self-interest -- in modern parlance, getting more of their genes
into future generations by greater reproductive success. Individuals are the unit of selection;
the "struggle for existence" is a matter among individuals (Stephen Gould).

_With very few exceptions_, the only parts of the theory of natural selection which have been
supported by mathematical models admit no possiblity of the evolution of any characters which are
on average to the disadvantage of the individuals possessing them. If natural selection followed
the classical models exclusively, species would not show any behavior more positively social than
the coming together of the

Even with qualifications regarding the possibility of group selection, the portrait of the
biologically based social personality that emerges is one of predominantly self-serving
opportunism EVEN FOR THE MOST SOCIAL SPECIES, for all species in which there is genetic
competition among the social co- operators, that is, where all members have the chance of
parenthood (Donald Campbell).

Unlike [Lorentz and Montagu], I think 'nature red in tooth and claw' sums up our modern
understanding of natural selection admirably. (Dawkins).

[END QUOTES]

Mike. How do you account for the the noble motives in yourself given that all these authors find
them incomprehensible? Or do you simply think these guys really don't really mean any of this, e.g.,
that they are diliberately overstating the case?

Do you disagree with E. O. Wilson's remark that altruism (e.g. concern for the species as a whole)
is 'the central theoretical problem of sociobiology'?

PR

Michael Ragland said:

My primary point in s.b.e. has been human beings will have to be genetically engineered in order
to not completely destroy ourselves and to be able to explore space i.e. leave planet earth.
These genetically engineered 'humans' will ultimately be very different for what passes as
'human' today. I do not believe in immortality but I do believe in legacy. Although I'm not a
scientist I hope my writings may serve a useful purpose in that people in the future might gain
inspiration from them. I admit its unlikely but I have nothing to lose. Is it vain? Yes, I'd be
lying if I said there wasn't an element of vanity. Although there are others who also see the
need for genetically engineering people I haven't come across that many writings.

I think its nothing but vanity through and through. But then I think that's all there is to "free
will" when you get right down to it, including my own. What I am up to is trying to understand how
you get from a process that selects for efficiency in perpetuating ITS OWN DNA to an organism such
as yourself concerned with making the world a better place given that these objectives are more
often than not at odds with each other (e.g., self-incinerating Buddhist monks). Dawkins' call for a
memetics doesn't constitute an explanation but rather a call for one:

I am occasionally accused of having backtracked on memes; of having lost heart, pulled in my
horns; had second thoughts. The truth is that my first thoughts were more modest than some
memeticists, including perhaps Dr. Blackmore. For me, the original mission of the meme was
negative...

The original didactic purpose of the meme was the negative one of cutting the gene down to size.
I became a little alarmed at the number of my readers who took the meme more positively as a
theory of human culture in its own right -- either to criticise it (unfairly given my original
modest intention) or to carry it far beyond the limits of what I then thought justified. This
was why I may have seemed to backtrack. (Dawkins, 1999).

Quoted message said:

MR:I understand your general point but it is not applicable to my statement, "Just because
something is natural doesn't necessarily mean it is right or should be that way i.e. is
biologically adaptive. I'm referring to Darwinian evolution. Mr. Menegay is correct I'm using
adaptive as an 'ought' word and not an 'is' word. That is a topic in itself but I wanted to
confirm that. You write,

No. Natural selection entails an 'ought', its a mundane causal 'ought'. Given that natural selection
is "true", we 'ought' to be "ruthlessly selfish", at least if our formal models have given us a
reliable representation of the process. The fact that many of us are driven by a more noble sort of
'ought', e.g., your concern to help the species as a whole, is yet to explained, given our current
supposition that nature has been engaged in a relentless crusade to eliminate noble intentions on
every occasion they have had to compete with "ruthless selfishness".

Quoted message said:

Response: You're missing the point. I made the statement, "Just because something is natural
doesn't necessarily mean it is right or should be that way
i.e. is biologically adaptive." This is not a 'causal ought'. It's a 'rational agent ought' but
not in the mode as 'love thy neighbor as thyself'. It is a rational agent ought based on the
faith progress in science will ultimately enable us to genetically engineer human beings. It
is not based on the moral maxim.

Your OBJECTIVE is reflective of a concern for others. The fact that you opt to accomplish it
employing technology is a matter of the means, not the ends. What needs to be explained is why the
ends you have in mind differ so radically from those nature has supposedly been selecting for. My
hypothesis is 'an increase in cognitive objectivity (knowledge, intelligence, rationality, wisdom,
etc.) "facilitates" (Hume) an increase in valuative objectivity (impartiality, the moral maxim,
etc.) IRRESPECTIVE OF ITS ADAPTIVENESS. And, to the extent you find the matter of interest, I
believe I can support this hypothesis with evidence that:

a: the deviations from the predicted valuative profile ("ruthless selfishness"😉 in human nature
have been cognitively induced.

and

b: that at least some of this cognitively induced deviation is maladpative.

Quoted message said:

Response: One has to question if the moral oughts you refer to (moral maxim) are truly rational
agent oughts. As you point out they've existed for thousands of years yet haven't generally been
adhered to. What good is a moral maxim which is ultimately useless?

Its not. You are already adhering to it in your pursuit of a better world for others. The fact that
we as a species do not have the neurological equipment to FULLY ATTAIN the ideal does not mean that
it is useless. And the fact that our own irrational motivational foundations prevent us from fully
attaining a rational ideal is hardly an argument that the ideal itself is irrational:

Special concern for one's own future would be selected by evolution: Animals without such concern
would be more likely to die before passing on their genes. Such concern would remain, as a
natural fact, even if we decided that it was not justified. By thinking hard about the arguments,
we might be able briefly to stun this natural concern. But it would soon revive... The fact that
we have this attitude cannot therefore be a reason for thinking it justified. Whether it is
justified [i.e. rational] is an open question, waiting to be answered (Derek Parfit, 'Reasons and
Persons'😉.

PR

Why We Turned Out Like Captain Kirk Instead of Mr. Spock:
The Psychodynamics of Genetic Indeterminism
fortunecity.comKirk.htmOpen ↗

Michael Ragland said:

Response: We've never survived automatically. Personally, I think one's level of 'morality' is
largely genetic. There are very few saints in the world and very few true devils. Most people fall
somewhere between the two. If you read Freud you learn the most primitive part of us is the ID,
the EGO represents self and the SUPEREGO represents the conscience i.e. moral and laws of society.
Because we are animals our ID is constrantly threating to overide the SUPEREGO. This threatens
civilization. I don't think most people 'strive' to be moral i.e. something they consciously
entertain. Part of what keeps people in check is the knowledge there are consequences to their
actions. That is why there are laws. I can't steal a car or murder somebody and expect to get away
with it. I may or may not get away but I know its against the law. The reality that so many cars
are stolen and people murdered shows how even knowing the possible negative consequences is not
sufficient to stop people from committing such crimes.

On this we are in total agreement. Where we differ is in my belief that what needs to be explained
is, not the evil in the world ("ruthless selfishness"😉, but the good. Natural selection is not a
free ride. It comes equipped with some fairly severe constraints, one's which so far you seem to be
totally oblivious to.

Quoted message said:

MR:I think questions of whether natural selection is justified or rational is interesting. Looking
strictly at the mechanism of natural selection itself I think questioning whether it is
justified or irrational is moot.

No. Its not moot. We have every reason to believe that nature is ARATIONAL, that rationality ia a
relatively recent innovation appearing for the most part in one species of organism. Further more,
for one of us at least, there is reason to believe that once you throw rationality into the nat
selection mix some very bizare things start to happen in that you end up with creatures that become
less and less concerned with staying alive (e.g., the 9/11 terrorists) and more and more concerned
with sustaining REASONS for staying alive (needs for love, achievement, moral integrity, purpose,
meaning, your concern for the species as a whole, etc.).

Quoted message said:

PR: Nature has EMPLOYED rationality in one of her species to achieve her strategic end.
Unfortunately, too many assume that the end itself must therefore be rational.

Response: Come again? I see no evidence nature has employed rationality to achieve a
strategic end.

You don't believe you and I are rational and that we are the products of natural selection? You
don't believe that we have for the most part been "designed" to perpetuate ourselves by employing
our rationality?

Quoted message said:

In terms of Darwinian evolution I see no teleology.

Nat selection a a blind mechanical process. But one of things this process has apparently produced
has been creatures endowed with a modicum of rationality who can actually come to understand and
eventually question their own motivational foundations.

Quoted message said:

MR:Unlike the past, we can't continue to rely on natural selection. Why? Because natural selection
from a 'moral' standpoint is savage and entails war.

But ignoring the constraints of our current understanding of natural selection isn't going to help
much. In order to control evil it helps to understand good, in particular, why there is any good at
all in a naturally selected world given that altruism is "the central theoretical problem of
sociobiology (E. O. Wilson).

Quoted message said:

Response: How do you know you aren't amoral and irrational? For thousands of years Europeans
persecuted, expelled and committed pogroms against Jews and they considered what they were doing
was moral. What about the Europeans who came to the Americas and wipe out the Native Americans? In
order to do this the utmost rationality was required. Granted the process of comprehending,
inferring and thinking was largely genocidal but it was nevertheless rational. The same with the
Third Reich. Rationality in and of itself has nothing necessarily to do with being moral. I think
you may be narrowly defining rationality by meaning the moral maxim but rationality means more
than this. Rationality occupies a small place in the mind. Irrationality occupies a much larger
place. Irrational goals can be facilitated by rational thought.

Its justification is on EPISTEMIC grounds, not pragmatic grounds. Confusing the two is why it has
been mistakenly assumed for the past several hundred years that you can't obtain an 'ought' form an
'is': [from my previous post]:

2. Corroborate the epistemic credentials (the "is" component of the ought derivation) of the above
"theory" in terms of its ability to maximize explanatory coherence better than any of its
competitors (means/end, egoism, etc.).

For example:

a. The theory can "explain", at least in a conceptual framework not available from the
perspective of competing theories, both the excessive altruism and the emotional
instability (volatility in self-worth) observable in [censored] sapiens, in that they can both be
construed as two different sides of the same valuative objectivity coin (an equalizing of
value between the interests of others and one's self). Since in the above theory,
rationality correlates with valuative objectivity, [censored] sapiens would be construed as
having become MORE RATIONAL than the predicted norm (ruthless selfishness). While this
doesn't offer us an immediate causal account of the anomalies in question (altruism and
emotional instability), it certainly offers one a new conceptual framework for thinking
about them which, in turn, might lead to an improved causal account (e.g., they are
maladaptive byproducts of the evolution of rationality).

b. The theory can shed new light on a number of rationality paradoxes such as Newcomb's
Problem, Prisoner's Dilemma, etc., in that all such paradoxes stem from the assumption that
rationality is a strategic attribute

c. The theory can circumvent the logical paradoxes of rational irrationality, similar to the
example offered by Derek Parfit on page 12 of 'Reasons and Persons'.

d. The theory can explain the chaos of the Cohen symposium on rationality ('The Behavioral and
Brain Sciences', 1981, 4, 317-370) by sharpening the distinction between logic and
reasoning (I wouldn't go into this here).

e. The theory can offer intersubjectively reproducible empirical evidence (feelings of
worthlessness) that mother nature's most rational species is beginning to show signs of
"standing outside the system" (Lucas) corroborating the Lucas and Penrose position on the
implications of Godel's incompleteness theorem (i.e., minds are not machines). (again a bit
too complex an issue for explanation in this particular post).

f. The theory is compatible with what is the currently accepted paradigm for practical
rationality, the 'equal weight' criterion, albeit extended beyond the periphery of self-
interest: [end previous post insert]

Quoted message said:

PR: A agree that the causal 'ought' of natural selection ("ruthless selfishness"😉 is the exact
opposite of the 'ought' of rationality/ morality (love others as you love yourself). I have not
yet presented you with my explanation for their resolution, although your skepticism on the matter
is certainly justified given that they are indeed the exact opposite of each other.

Response: Thanks for admiting that.

But your the one who is maintaining that the goodness in human nature (limited though it is) DOESN'T
need to be explained -- that Dawkins and others have already explained it. Don't you remember?

"I see no explanatory void between the theory of natural selection and human nature. Nor do I
think Dawkins does. A meme is a thought/idea which is non-genetically imitated. A meme has no
biological advantages. Simply because natural selection is different from a meme doesn't mean
there is an explanatory void."

Quoted message said:

MR:You state the moral maxim one ought to 'Love (value) their neighbor as they love (value)
themself'. Yes, this moral maxim has existed for thousands of years. I see no evidence,
however, of it being widely 'accepted' if one means adhered to.

What does that have to do with its rationality, given the likelhood that we ourselves are unlikely
to be rational in any but a highly relative sense of the term?

Quoted message said:

Response: I dispute most of us accept it as a worthy or noble ideal. I'll say some do.

But they are in need of a biological explanation, given that "ruthless selfishness" is the predicted
norm. What needs explaining is your own internal motives toward a greater good. How in the world did
you obtain a rational 'ought' given your irrational motivational foundations and the fact that
nature has been eradicating every self-sacrificing individual she can get her hands on?

Quoted message said:

Response: I disagree we approximate it to a far greater degree than other species. I don't think
memetics has anything to do with.

You don't think man is more of a moral creature than other species? That's a new one on me.

Quoted message said:

PR: I'm not advocating ANYTHING. You wanted to know how to derive a moral 'ought' from an
epistemic 'is'. I've shown you how.

Response: You're presenting an argument.

I'm not advocating you become rational. I'm merely advocating a theory of what rationality entails.
As a matter of fact, I think its entirely possible to become a little too rational for your own
good. That's why we as a species have to spend endless amounts of effort and energy trying to
convince ourselves we are important (needs for love, achievement, moral integrity, purpose, meaning,
etc.), because we now longer believe in our own importance automatically, but are constantly in
search of REASONS for believeing in our own importance.

Quoted message said:

In that sense you are indeed advocating something. You wouldn't bother writing the argument unless
you thought it might lead to somebody acknowledging it. Let's not [censored] here.

I'm advocating A THEORY. I am not advocating behavior. Whether someone chooses to be rational or not
is up to them. Frankly, I think its possible to become a little too rational for your own good, so I
think it should be taken with a grain of salt. Because we are the product of natural selection and
an inherently irrational motivational system, I really don't think we have the neurological
equipment to be more than very modestly rational. More than that and the nervous system goes into
meltdown (emotional disorder).

Quoted message said:

Response: Who said the unfit were benevolent?

These guys:

Be warned that if you wish, as I do, to build a society in which individuals cooperate
generously and unselfishly towards a common good, you can expect little help from biological
nature. Let us try to TEACH generosity and altruism, because WE ARE BORN SELFISH. Let us
understand what our selfish genes are upt to, because we may then at least have the chance
to UPSET THEIR DESIGNS, SOMETHING THAT NO OTHER SPECIES HAS EVER ASPIRED TO. (Dawkins)
[emphasis mine]

The identification of individuals as the unit of selection is a central theme in Darwin's
thought. This idea underliees his most radical claim: that evolution is purposeless and without
inherent direction. ... Evolution does not recognize the 'good' of the ecosystem' or even the
'good of the species.' Any harmony or stability is only an indirect result of individuals
relentlessly pursuing their own self-interest -- in modern parlance, getting more of their genes
into future generations by greater reproductive success. Individuals are the unit of selection;
the "struggle for existence" is a matter among individuals (Stephen Gould).

_With very few exceptions_, the only parts of the theory of natural selection which have been
supported by mathematical models admit no possiblity of the evolution of any characters which are
on average to the disadvantage of the individuals possessing them. If natural selection followed
the classical models exclusively, species would not show any behavior more positively social than
the coming together of the

Clearly from a gene's point of view it is worthwhile to deprive a large number of distant
relatives in order to extract a small reproductive advantage. (W. D. Hamilton)

Like Chicago gangsters, our genes have survived, in some cases for millions of years, in a
highly competitive world. This entitles us to expect certain qualities in our genes. I shall
argue that a predominent quality to be expected in a successful gene is ruthless selfishness.
This gene selfishness will usually give rise to selfishness in individual behavior. However, as
we shall see, there are special circumstances in which a gene can achieve its own selfish goals
best by fostering a limited form of altruism. 'Special' and 'limited' are important words in
the last sentence. Much as we might wish to believe otherwise, universal love and the welfare
of the species as a whole are concepts which simply do not make evolutionary sense (Dawkins).

Even with qualifications regarding the possibility of group selection, the portrait of the
biologically based social personality that emerges is one of predominantly self-serving
opportunism EVEN FOR THE MOST SOCIAL SPECIES, for all species in which there is genetic
competition among the social co- operators, that is, where all members have the chance of
parenthood (Donald Campbell).

Humans and baboons have evolved by natural selection. If you look at the way natural selection
works, it seems to follow that anything that has evolved by natural selection should be selfish.
Therefore we must expect that when we go and look at the behaviour of baboons, humans, and all
other living creatures, we shall find it to selfish. If we find that our expectation is wrong,
if we observe that human behavior is truly altruistic, the we shall be faced with something
puzzling, SOMETHING THAT NEEDS EXPLAINING [my caps] (Richard Dawkins).

It is ironic that Ashley Montagu should criticize Lorentz as 'a direct descendent of the "nature
red in tooth and claw" thinkers of the nineteenth century....' As I understand Lorentz' view of
evolution, he would be very much at one with Montagu in rejecting the implications of Tennyson's
phrase. Unlike both of them, I think 'nature red in tooth and claw' sums up our modern
understanding of natural selection admirably. (Dawkins).

[endquotes]

Quoted message said:

PR: Not even if we view morality as a maladaptive by-product of the evolution of rationality?

Response: How do you think it is maladaptive?

The moral maxim 'love your neighbor as you love yourself' is the exact opposite of the "ruthless
selfishness" predicted by our formal models. Almost by definition, the opposite of what is adaptive
("ruthless selfishness"😉 is going to be maladaptive. I thought that was one of the few things we
agreed on.

[previous remarks]

PR: A agree that the causal 'ought' of natural selection ("ruthless selfishness"😉 is the exact
opposite of the 'ought' of rationality/ morality (love others as you love yourself). I have not
yet presented you with my explanation for their resolution, although your skepticism on the
matter is certainly justified given that they are indeed the exact opposite of each other.

Response: Thanks for admiting that.

[end previous remarks]

PR

Michael Ragland said:

PR: While these comments may seem rather mundane from the perspective of what we have come to
expect from our fellow humans, you seem blissfully ignorant of the fact that such noble motives
are currently incomprehensible from the perspective of the only viable hypothesis we have of the
processes that produced us:

Response: Of course I'm not blissfully ignorant that such 'noble' motives are currently
incomprehensible from the perspective of the only viable hypothesis we have of the processes that
produced us i.e. Darwinian evolution. I'm amazed Phil. I've spent the last two or three years on
and off on s.b.e. writing about how Darwinian evolution is contrary to such 'noble' motives and
the NEED for genetic engineering.

Referring to an explanatory void between feature X and theory Y is just another way of talking about
the fact that feature X is incomprehensble from the perspective of theory Y. What else could it
possibly mean?

Quoted message said:

Mike. How do you account for the the noble motives in yourself given that all these authors find
them incomprehensible? Or do you simply think these guys really don't really mean any of this,
e.g., that they are diliberately overstating the case?

Response: They are scientists. The scientists you quote may or may not have such 'noble' desires.
Dawkins apparently entertains such when he refers to us being the only species which may upset
their designs. The only way that can be done is through genetic engineering which Dawkins may or
may not have been thinking about when he stated that. All those scientists are describing 'natural
selection'. Don't necessarily think these scientists think natural selection is right. They may or
may not. They are describing it.

No. No. No. They are most definitely NOT describing the way the world "is", at least not the part of
it occupied by human beings. Human being would probably be most aptly described as "benevolently
selfish". It would be just plain crazy for Donald Campbell to claim that human beings exhibit
"nothing more positively social than care for offspring and the

DISCREPENCY between what our best theory PREDICTS and what actually EXISTS. Natural selection is not
a religious dogma, it a scientific hypothesis complete with enigmas and anomalies where reality
itself is concerned. That's why it was necessary for Dawkins to write an entire last chapter that
was nothing less than a disclaimer. He was saying that we have made tremendous strides in our
understanding of altruism IN NON-HUMAN SPECIES, but that when it comes to the altruistic extremes in
human nature (e.g., the "altruism" of the 9/11 terrorists) we haven't even scratched the surface. We
are going to need a hypothetical X, something no one can currently envision, that for the time being
we will simply refer to as "memetics". That's why he went out of his way to make a disclaimer in the
Intro to Blackmore's book on memes. He had nothing postive in mind, just an empty space that as of
yet needs to be filled with a full fledged addendum to the theory of natural selection so that we
can get it to encompass some of the appalingly maladpative things we find in human nature (e.g., self-
incinerating Buddhist monks). He is saying that, far from explaining human nature, our formal models
have rendered it even more of an enigma than previously imagined.

The only guy who made the kind of mistake you are referring to was
E. O. Wilson in the last chapter of 'Sociobiology'. And he caught holy hell for it. He didn't
actually claim we had solved the mystery of human nature, but he also wasn't careful enough to
tone down his enthusiasm, making it seem as though we were right on the verge of some big
breakthrough. He got in one hell of a mess as a result, and his career most definitely took a
turn for the worse. He not only had things thrown at him and dumped on his head, but a group of
scientists, etc. referred to as 'Sociobiology Study Group of Science for the People' headed by
Steve Gould and Richard Lewontin took out full page adds and denounciations in major
publications.

Quoted message said:

PR: Do you disagree with E. O. Wilson's remark that altruism (e.g. concern for the species as a
whole) is 'the central theoretical problem of sociobiology'?

Response: When I have read about 'altruism' in sociobiology it has made no reference to concern
for the species as a whole. It has been in reference to kin selection. I don't think humans have a
concern for their species as a whole.

Immediate kin are the EXCEPTION to the "ruthless selfishness" we should expect to find:

I shall argue that a predominent quality to be expected in a successful gene is ruthless
selfishness. This gene selfishness will usually give rise to selfishness in individual
behavior. However, as we shall see, there are SPECIAL circumstances in which a gene can achieve
its own selfish goals best by fostering a LIMITED form of altruism. 'SPECIAL' and 'LIMITED' are
important words in the last sentence. Much as we might wish to believe otherwise, universal
love and the welfare of the species as a whole are concepts which simply do not make
evolutionary sense (Dawkins).

PR

Michael Ragland said:

Response2: Phil, I changed my mind. Once I enter into an exchange with a poster I should follow
through. One of the reasons I've been hesitant is because your objective of where does "good"
come from seems mainly on the level of mental massturbation i.e. very weakly reflected in the
real world.

I would argue that most of the major evil in the world couldn't have been accomplished were it not
for folks willing to sacrifice their personal interests in the pursuit of what they viewed as "a
greater good" (e.g., 9/11 terrorists). So you if you want to understand evil, at least that which
transcends what is done for immediate personal gain, you would probably do well by trying to
understand good and, in particular, since it is currently a scientific anomaly, explaining why it
exists in a naturally selected world.

Quoted message said:

Since you've been in the entertainment industry for decades with the Kingtonnes I seriously
suggest you think about submitting a script to Hollywood. There have been movies made which
explore the theme such as "Miracle of Faith" as well as others. Past philosophers have addressed
the subject of "what is good" but it has usually been through means/ends
i.e. utilitarianism and not simply valuatively.

Yes. Rationality is often construed as a strategic attribute. However, the study of rationality is
currently confronted with myriads of contradictions and paradoxes. One way to circumvent these
problems, the one I have proposed, is to abandon this arbitrary assumption and replace it with an
alternate assumption, and then take a look at how much better that alternative assumption is at
addressing the anomalies and contradictions:

1. Assume that 'being rational' is NOT a matter of 'being efficient' (means/end theory) 'being
logical' (computationalism) 'being self-interested' (egoism) 'being happy' (pragmatism) 'being
strategically logical (game theory) 'following a universalizable maxim (Kant) 'fulfilling one's
desires' (hedonism) 'maximizing global happiness' (utilitarianism) etc. but simply a matter of
'being able to "see" what is going on' [non-formalizable a la the Lucas/Penrose view of Godel's
incompleteness theorem] with the metaphor unpacked to 'being rational' = 'being objective', not
only cognitively, BUT VALUATIVELY AS WELL.

Since this conclusion mirrors another widely accepted paradigm for practical rationality, the 'equal
weight' criterion, I'm a little confused about your contention that this amounts to little more than
"mental masturbation", an expression you appear to be inordinately fond of, BTW. 🙂

f. The theory is compatible with what is the currently accepted paradigm for practical
rationality, the 'equal weight' criterion, albeit extended beyond the periphery of
self-interest:

My feelings a year hence should be just as important to me as my feelings next minute, if
only I could make an equally sure forecast of them. Indeed this equal and impartial
concern for all parts of one's conscious life is perhaps the most prominent element in
the common notion of the _rational_. (Henry Sidgwick, 'The Methods of Ethics'😉.

All these theories [of rational self-interest] also claim that, in deciding what would be
best for someone, we should give equal weight to all the parts of this person's future.
Later events may be less predictable; and a predictable event should count for less if it
is less likely to happen. But it should not count for less merely because, if it happens,
it will happen later (Derek Parfit, 'Reasons and Persons'😉.

Quoted message said:

Response2: Doesn't make alot of sense Phil. Can you provide a bonafide dictionary definition of
"arational"?

The opposite of rational, devoid of rationality. As to what rationality "is", see above.

BTW, the whole point of Darwin's hypothesis was to explain how you could have fantastically complex
organisms that appear to have been designed without the need to postulate the prior existence of a
rational designer, i.e, the product of a process devoid of rationality, i.e, an arational process
meaning, blind, mechanical, devoid of intent or purpose, blah blah blah.

Quoted message said:

The evolution of rationality is very much tied to human progress in science i.e. discovering facts
about the earth, our solar system, our biology and that of other creatures, computers, etc, etc.
Before we could do any of this we had to have oral language and written language. Once we had
written language and the printing press our knowledge could be transmitted and preserved. You
appear to be difining rationality as that which is good. But rationality has nothing per se to do
with being good or evil. The 9/11 terrorists had to utilize a signifigant amount of rationality to
accomplish their objective. They had to learn how to fly jets, handle financial transactions,
remain undetected, etc. As I pointed out in one of my responses to you RATIONALITY has nothing
NECESSARILY to do with being GOOD.

True. You are echoing a point already eloquently made by the venerable Hume some 250 years ago:

Reason is the discovery of truth and falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists in the agreement
or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas or to the real existence and matter of
fact. Whatever therefore is not susceptible to this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of
being true or false, and can never be an object of our reason. (Treatise, Book III, Part I,
Section I).

The problem with this view, and at least Hume was consitent in maintaining it, is that it flies in
the face of counter-intuitive evidence. For example, according to Hume there would be nothing
irrational about burning down your house to obtain sufficient light to read your evening newspaper.
This seems so blatantly irrational to most of us (you and Hume excepted of course) that we have
found it necessary to introduce a new axiom into the mix, the one I already quoted above:

My feelings a year hence should be just as important to me as my feelings next minute, if only I
could make an equally sure forecast of them. Indeed this equal and impartial concern for all
parts of one's conscious life is perhaps the most prominent element in the common notion of the
_rational_. (Henry Sidgwick, 'The Methods of Ethics'😉.

All these theories [of rational self-interest] also claim that, in deciding what would be best
for someone, we should give equal weight to all the parts of this person's future. Later events
may be less predictable; and a predictable event should count for less if it is less likely to
happen. But it should not count for less merely because, if it happens, it will happen later
(Derek Parfit, 'Reasons and Persons'😉.

In case you haven't noticed, we have just introduced valuative objectivity into the rationality
equation as a defining criterion. Just extend it beyond the periphery of self interest and, voila,
you have the moral maxim and my own theory of rationality in one simple maneuver. You've also
resolved an unending number of contradictions and paradoxes along with providing yourself with an
explantion of what morality "is", i.e., an implicit theory of rationality we humans have been
subconsciously entertaining for the past several thousand years. As to why it has a motivating
influence on many of us, I've already explained this in my 'Divergent Theory of Emotional
Instability' paper that I posted earlier.

Quoted message said:

Response2: Do you believe you are rational?

No. I believe I am RELATIVELY MORE rational than members of other naturally selected species, but
far from rational in any ideal sense, since I believe that would be lethal, a small point you might
want to consider before you start tampering with other people's DNA, BTW.

Quoted message said:

According to you our being 'rational' is relative and that being too rational results in a
neurological meltdown. You write of your belief of being too rational for one's good.

Yes. You want to be just rational to the point where you might "know" you are insignificant, but not
so rational that you begin to "realize" it, such as when Betty Lu dumps you for that nerdy guy down
the street and you feel like you want to kill yourself. Indeed, that's all there is to free will, as
far as I'm concerned, is an unending serious of events in which we attempt to demonstrate to
ourselves that we are hot stuff and therefore that our lives are indeed worth preserving (e.g., you
and me duking it out on the internet before a small audience - very small judging from the nature of
some of our tedious and petty quibblings so far). 🙂

Quoted message said:

Response2: I would not attribute this to natural selection. When the bullets start flying and the
people start dying I don't think there will be time for questioning one's motivational
foundations.

No. The time to do that is before the bullets start to fly since, if my theory is correct, there is
a pretty good likelihood that once one understands the dynamics of one's own emotions the bullets
will no longer be necessary.

Quoted message said:

Response2: I've always seen altruism in sociobiology expressed in terms of kin selection. Can you
provide context for Wilson's statement?

Kin are the "special" and "limited" exception to the "ruthless selfishness" rule. Everywhere else it
should prevail.

Quoted message said:

Response: How do you know you aren't amoral and irrational? For thousands of years Europeans
persecuted, expelled and committed pogroms against Jews and they considered what they were doing
was moral. What about the Europeans who came to the Americas and wipe out the Native Americans? In
order to do this the utmost rationality was required. Granted the process of comprehending,
inferring and thinking was largely genocidal but it was nevertheless rational. The same with the
Third Reich. Rationality in and of itself has nothing necessarily to do with being moral.

It does if 'being rational' is more a matter of 'being objective' than a matter of 'being
efficient', 'being self-interested', 'being logical', etc. But the standard by which to assess this
is not by expressing your moral outrage, but by offering a theory of your own that can outexplain
the one I have proposed.

Quoted message said:

I think you may be narrowly defining rationality by meaning the moral maxim but rationality means
more than this.

I agree. In addition to a cognitive/epistemic rationality, a strategic rationality, and a valuative
rationality, I wouldn't be at all surprised to eventually find there is also an aesthetic and
humourique rationality, particularly if its simply a matter of 'being able to "see" what is going
on' (non-formalizable), as Penrose and Lucas via Godel have maintained for quite some time.

Quoted message said:

Rationality occupies a small place in the mind. Irrationality occupies a much larger place.
Irrational goals can be facilitated by rational thought.

No argument. We are relatively rational, and its a fairly modest amount, unless I'm mistaken,
particularly in the values department where nature endlessly hones genetic blueprints to produce
efficiency rather than impartiality. Its just that she inadvertently manufactures more impartiality
than she can eliminate via the mechanism I have referred to as 'the moralization mechanism in the
paper URL'd below.

Cheers! PR

Why We Turned Out Like Captain Kirk Instead of Mr. Spock:
The Psychodynamics of Genetic Indeterminism
fortunecity.comKirk.htmOpen ↗

"Phil Roberts, Jr." <[email hidden]> wrote in
:"]news:[email hidden]:

Quoted message said:

I think its nothing but vanity through and through. But then I think that's all there is to "free
will" when you get right down to it, including my own. What I am up to is trying to understand how
you get from a process that selects for efficiency in perpetuating ITS OWN DNA to an organism such
as yourself concerned with making the world a better place given that these objectives are more
often than not at odds with each other (e.g., self-incinerating Buddhist monks). Dawkins' call for
a memetics doesn't constitute an explanation but rather a call for one:

Quoted message said:

Quoted message said:

I understand your general point but it is not applicable to my statement, "Just because something
is natural doesn't necessarily mean it is right or should be that way
i.e. is biologically adaptive. I'm referring to Darwinian evolution.
Mr. Menegay is correct I'm using adaptive as an 'ought' word and not an 'is' word. That is a
topic in itself but I wanted to confirm that.

Quoted message said:

No. Natural selection entails an 'ought', its a mundane causal 'ought'. Given that natural
selection is "true", we 'ought' to be "ruthlessly selfish", at least if our formal models have
given us a reliable representation of the process. The fact that many of us are driven by a more
noble sort of 'ought', e.g., your concern to help the species as a whole, is yet to explained,
given our current supposition that nature has been engaged in a relentless crusade to eliminate
noble intentions on every occasion they have had to compete with "ruthless selfishness".

Here I must object. Game theory tells us that positive sum games will win out over zero sum games.
The catch is that we must figure out how to play positive sum games. But nature is replete with
examples - lichens is a nice one, and it would be wise to remember that humans can not exist
without numerous other symbiotes. So "ruthless selfishness" is an untenable hypothesis in the face
of the evidence.

Now I may be carrying my argument to an extreme. The "selfish gene" is probably a good first
approximation, and some of the emotions you are discussing do appear even in a first approximation.
But Trivers and Hamilton have demonstrated the power of selfishness to produce altruism. As has
often been noted, the "ultimate" result of the altruism may be selfish _but the proximate emotion
felt will be altruistic_. So nature on many occasions will create rather than eliminate "noble
intentions".

.. My hypothesis is 'an

Quoted message said:

increase in cognitive objectivity (knowledge, intelligence, rationality, wisdom, etc.)
"facilitates" (Hume) an increase in valuative objectivity (impartiality, the moral maxim, etc.)
IRRESPECTIVE OF ITS ADAPTIVENESS. And, to the extent you find the matter of interest, I believe I
can support this hypothesis with evidence that:

a: the deviations from the predicted valuative profile ("ruthless selfishness"😉 in human
nature have been cognitively induced.

and

b: that at least some of this cognitively induced deviation is maladpative.

Well I am interested in your hypothesis. Although as I have noted above, I don't think "ruthless
selfishness" is necessarily predicted, the positive sum alternative requires an explanation - how do
you get there from here - and your hypothesis may help.

Now as to your point (b), I am of three minds:

1. It is often argued (and seems to be true from the success of [censored] sapiens vs. its conspecifics)
that increased intelligence (rationality, wisdom, etc.) is quite adaptive. But:

2. I am getting very fed up with waking up at 4 AM worrying about my latest project at work, And:

3. It has also been supposed that those of lower intelligence have more children (although I have
never seen convincing genetic evidence relating long term allele frequencies to IQ measurements).

Of course, just because intelligence is adaptive does not require it to make you happier, and
perhaps your argument about the cognitively induced deviation being maladaptive is about discomfort
rather than decreased reproductive success. Looking at current American culture, it would appear
that, for males, exceptional musical or athletic prowess is more likely to result in high
reproductive success than exceptional intellectual prowess. I have to say that I don't know that
athletes and musicians are any happier on the whole than intellectuals, which may reflect on your
hypothesis regarding the maladaptiveness of intelligence.

Yours,

Bill Morse

William Morse said:

"Phil Roberts, Jr." <[email hidden]> wrote

Quoted message said:

No. Natural selection entails an 'ought', its a mundane causal 'ought'. Given that natural
selection is "true", we 'ought' to be "ruthlessly selfish", at least if our formal models have
given us a reliable representation of the process. The fact that many of us are driven by a more
noble sort of 'ought', e.g., your concern to help the species as a whole, is yet to explained,
given our current supposition that nature has been engaged in a relentless crusade to eliminate
noble intentions on every occasion they have had to compete with "ruthless selfishness".

Here I must object. Game theory tells us that positive sum games will win out over zero sum games.
The catch is that we must figure out how to play positive sum games. But nature is replete with
examples - lichens is a nice one, and it would be wise to remember that humans can not exist
without numerous other symbiotes. So "ruthless selfishness" is an untenable hypothesis in the face
of the evidence.

No. Ruthless selfishness can be MEDIATED by an understanding of how social contracts can be in one's
own selfish interest. As such, intelligence can no doubt produce a massive increase in INSTRUMENTAL
values and can indeed foster co-operation and so long as the cost balance sheet comes out in one's
favor, it poses no problem for the theory of natural selection. As I explain in my paper URL'd below
"overtly kindly acts can serve as a highly effective means to a ruthlessly selfish end, as many
pedophiles will attest."

What needs to be explained are not instrumental values, where one can duck out of an agreement
the instant it is no longer in one's self interest, but INTRINSIC valuing of others, not as
means, but as ends in themselves, such as when an older man might give up his seat in a life boat
to save a woman or a child whom he has never met before. These acts are in need of an
evolutionary explanation, since we have reason to believe that the genetic blueprints for nervous
systems that would be capable of housing such lethal memes should have been winnowed from the
population eons ago.

That's where we come back to my basic premise, i.e., that 'an increase in cognitive objectivity
(knowledge, cognitive competence, wisdom, etc.) "facilitates" (Hume) an increase in valuative
objectivity (an increase in the intrinsic uothers juxtaposed with an increase volatility in self-
value [e.g., guilt]).

Quoted message said:

Now I may be carrying my argument to an extreme. The "selfish gene" is probably a good first
approximation, and some of the emotions you are discussing do appear even in a first
approximation.

Yep. The old half empty glass routine. The problem is that its all too easy to forget just what a
stark forboding place the theory actually predicts. Franz DeWaal ('Good Natured'😉 has done much to
muddy the waters by pointing out that there are examples of empathy in the animal kingdom other than
man, but without making any attempt to present the other side. I recently watched a documentary on
wolves that pretty much sums up my own view on the matter, one in which the lady who kept them caged
was ranting and raving about what noble beasts they were and how they cared for the young and even
on occasion, to a limited extent, the older wolves. AT which time an attendent came with a bucket of
meat and the inteviewer asked, "Are we going to go inside the cage and feed the wolves now?". The
owners response was, "Oh! You wouldn't want to do that. You could loose a finger." 🙂

Quoted message said:

But Trivers and Hamilton have demonstrated the power of selfishness to produce altruism. As has
often been noted, the "ultimate" result of the altruism may be selfish _but the proximate emotion
felt will be altruistic_. So nature on many occasions will create rather than eliminate "noble
intentions".

But again, I have to remind you that the words 'special' and 'limited' are very important. And with
respect to Trivers, we can only account for instrumental values. Again, we can not explain how an
organism would make the ultimate sacrifice for a non-related other (e.g., the
9/11 terrorsts, the 9/11 rescue workers, self-incinerating Buddhist monks, etc.). Think of how the
runt of the litter is treated by its siblings, for the other side of the "its all a love fest out
there" side of the argument (DeWaal and others).

Quoted message said:

.. My hypothesis is 'an

Quoted message said:

increase in cognitive objectivity (knowledge, intelligence, rationality, wisdom, etc.)
"facilitates" (Hume) an increase in valuative objectivity (impartiality, the moral maxim, etc.)
IRRESPECTIVE OF ITS ADAPTIVENESS. And, to the extent you find the matter of interest, I believe I
can support this hypothesis with evidence that:

a: the deviations from the predicted valuative profile ("ruthless selfishness"😉 in human
nature have been cognitively induced.

and

b: that at least some of this cognitively induced deviation is maladpative.

Well I am interested in your hypothesis. Although as I have noted above, I don't think "ruthless
selfishness" is necessarily predicted, the positive sum alternative requires an explanation - how
do you get there from here - and your hypothesis may help.

Now as to your point (b), I am of three minds:

I've offered the evidence for point B in the section titled "Free Will" in the paper URL'd below.

Quoted message said:

1. It is often argued (and seems to be true from the success of [censored] sapiens vs. its conspecifics)
that increased intelligence (rationality, wisdom, etc.) is quite adaptive. But:

2. I am getting very fed up with waking up at 4 AM worrying about my latest project at work, And:

3. It has also been supposed that those of lower intelligence have more children (although I have
never seen convincing genetic evidence relating long term allele frequencies to IQ
measurements).

Of course, just because intelligence is adaptive does not require it to make you happier, and
perhaps your argument about the cognitively induced deviation being maladaptive is about
discomfort rather than decreased reproductive success. Looking at current American culture, it
would appear that, for males, exceptional musical or athletic prowess is more likely to result in
high reproductive success than exceptional intellectual prowess. I have to say that I don't know
that athletes and musicians are any happier on the whole than intellectuals, which may reflect on
your hypothesis regarding the maladaptiveness of intelligence.

Its ok to be cognitively objective. The problem is when you start to become a little too VALUATIVELY
objective, when you begin to REALIZE rather than merely know that you are insignificant that you
start to get into problems. Animals don't have to contend with this sort of lethal meme, and so they
don't have to spend their entire lives trying to counteract it the way humans do, i.e., our
insatiable appetites for love, attention, purpose, moral integrity, meaning, wealth, power, etc.).
That's a lot of what you and are doing right here, IMHO. I'm trying to impress my fellow man that I
have a powerful and interesting take on the altruism problem that doesn't show up anywhere in the
literature. You are trying to do somewhat

PR

Why We Turned Out Like Captain Kirk Instead of Mr. Spock:
The Psychodynamics of Genetic Indeterminism
fortunecity.comKirk.htmOpen ↗