No big shock here that recently retired generals and other high level
officers are stating the obvious: Rumsfeld is worthless as the SECDEF
and needs to go, sooner the better. He¹s single handedly responsible for
the cluster f*&# in Iraq (regardless of how you feel about the wisdom of
going there in the first place).
_________________________________________________
For his failures, Rumsfeld must go
Paul D. Eaton The New York Times
MONDAY, MARCH 20, 2006
FOX ISLAND, Washington During World War II, American soldiers en route
to Britain before D-Day were given a pamphlet on how to behave while
awaiting the invasion. The most important quote was: "It is impolite to
criticize your host; it is militarily stupid to criticize your allies."
By that rule, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is not competent to lead
America's armed forces. First, his failure to build coalitions with U.S.
allies from what he dismissively called "old Europe" has imposed far
greater demands and risks on American soldiers in Iraq than necessary.
Second, he alienated his allies in the U.S. military, ignoring the
advice of seasoned officers and denying subordinates any chance for
input.
In sum, he has shown himself incompetent strategically, operationally
and tactically and is far more than anyone else responsible for what has
happened to America's mission in Iraq. Rumsfeld must step down.
In the five years he has presided over the Pentagon, I have seen
groupthink become dominant and a growing reluctance by experienced
military men and civilians to challenge the notions of the senior
leadership.
I thought we had a glimmer of hope last November when General Peter
Pace, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, faced off with Rumsfeld
on the question of how U.S. soldiers should react if they witnessed
illegal treatment of prisoners by Iraqi authorities. (Pace's view was
that U.S. soldiers should intervene, while Rumsfeld's position was that
they should simply report the incident to superiors.)
Unfortunately, the general backed down, giving the impression that
America's senior man in uniform is just as intimidated by Rumsfeld as
was his predecessor, General Richard Myers.
Rumsfeld has put the Pentagon at the mercy of his ego, his Cold
Warrior's view of the world and his unrealistic confidence in technology
to replace manpower. As a result, the U.S. Army finds itself severely
undermanned - cut to 10 active divisions but asked by the administration
to support a foreign policy that requires at least 12 or 14.
Only General Eric Shinseki, the army chief of staff when President
George W. Bush was elected, had the courage to challenge the downsizing
plans. So Rumsfeld retaliated by naming Shinseki's successor more than a
year before his scheduled retirement, effectively undercutting his
authority. The rest of the senior brass got the message, and nobody has
complained since.
Now the Pentagon's new Quadrennial Defense Review shows that Rumsfeld
also fails to understand the nature of protracted counterinsurgency
warfare in Iraq and the demands it places on ground forces. The
document, amazingly, does not call for enlarging the army; rather, it
increases only Special Operations forces, by a token 15 percent, maybe
1,500 troops.
Rumsfeld has also failed in terms of operations in Iraq. He rejected the
so-called Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force and sent just enough
tech-enhanced troops to complete what we called Phase III of the war -
ground combat against the uniformed Iraqis. He ignored competent
advisers like General Anthony Zinni and others who predicted that the
Iraqi forces might melt away, leading to chaos.
It is all too clear that Shinseki was right: Several hundred thousand
men would have made a big difference then, as we began Phase IV, or
country reconstruction. There was never a question that we would make
quick work of the Iraqi Army.
Last, you do not expect a secretary of defense to be criticized for
tactical ineptness. Normally, tactics are the domain of the soldier on
the ground. But in this case we all felt what L. Paul Bremer, the former
viceroy in Iraq, has called the "8,000-mile screwdriver" reaching from
the Pentagon. Commanders in the field had their discretionary financing
for things like rebuilding hospitals randomly cut; money to pay Iraqi
construction companies to build barracks was withheld; contracts for
purchasing military equipment for the new Iraqi army were rewritten back
in Washington.
So, what to do?
First, President Bush should accept the offer to resign that Rumsfeld
says he has tendered more than once, and hire a man who will listen to
and support the magnificent soldiers on the ground. Perhaps a proven
Democrat like Senator Joseph Lieberman could repair fissures that have
arisen both between parties and between uniformed men and the Pentagon
big shots.
More vital in the longer term, Congress must assert itself. Too much
power has shifted to the executive branch, not just in terms of waging
war but also in planning the military of the future. Congress should
remember it still has the power of the purse; it should call U.S.
generals, colonels, captains and sergeants to testify frequently, so
that their opinions and needs are known to the men they lead. Then when
they are asked if they have enough troops - and no soldier has ever had
enough of anything, more is always better - the reply is public.
Our most important, and sometimes most severe, judges are our
subordinates. That is a fact I discovered early in my military career.
It is, unfortunately, a lesson Rumsfeld seems incapable of learning.
Paul D. Eaton, a retired U.S. Army major general, was in charge of
training the Iraqi military from 2003 to 2004
--
Will Brink @ http://www.brinkzone.com/