We all by now know how the UCI and IOC are lying saying neither was responsible for the loss of the kilo. Looks like another international track sport has problems too with it governing body. Read on from an insider about F1:
Much has be written about the politics surrounding the 2005 USGP at INDY…………..for those who missed this account the first time…………..here is what most people accept as the real reason 7 of the 10 teams refused to participate…………..
"What follows is a press release from the MinardiF1 team giving the
views of Paul Stoddart.
"Much has been said about the farce that occurred on Sunday, June 19, in
Indianapolis, and I feel that in the interests of transparency, it would
be worthwhile for someone who was actually present, and participated in
the discussions leading up to the start of the Grand Prix, to provide a
truthful account of what took place, both for the 100,000-plus fans who
were present, and for the hundreds of millions of people watching on
television around the world.
While this is a genuine attempt to provide a factual timeline of the
relevant events that took place, should any minor detail or sequence be
disputed, it will not, in my opinion, affect in any way this account of
events that led up to arguably the most damaging spectacle in the recent
history of Formula One.
Background
For those who have not followed the recent political developments in
Formula One, it is fair to say that, for over a year now, the majority
of teams have felt at odds with the actions of the FIA and its
President, Max Mosley, concerning the regulations, and the way in which
those regulations have been introduced, or are proposed to be
introduced. Not a weekend has gone by where some, or all, of the teams
are not discussing or disputing these regulations. This is so much the
case that it is common knowledge the manufacturers have proposed their
own series commencing January 1, 2008, and this is supported by at least
two of the independent teams. The general perception is that, in many
instances, these issues have become personal, and it is my opinion that
was a serious contributory factor to the failure to find a solution that
would have allowed all 20 cars to compete in Sunday¹s United States
Grand Prix.
The Facts
Friday, June 17
I noticed that Ricardo Zonta¹s Toyota had stopped, but in all honesty,
did not pay any attention to the reasons why; however, I actually
witnessed Ralf Schumacher¹s accident, both on the monitors, and more
significantly, I could see what took place from my position on the pit
wall. This necessitated a red flag, and in the numerous replays on the
monitors, it looked very much like the cause of the accident was a
punctured rear tyre.
Throughout the afternoon, numerous people in the paddock suggested it
was a tyre failure and commented that it was similar to the serious
accident which befell Ralf Schumacher during the 2004 US Grand Prix.
Later that evening was the first time I was aware of a potential problem
with the Michelin tyres at this event. In all honesty, I didn¹t pay a
great deal of attention, as our team is on Bridgestone tyres.
Saturday, June 18
On arriving at the circuit, the word throughout the paddock was that
there was a potential problem with the rear tyres supplied to all
Michelin teams for this event, and it became evident as the first and
second sessions were run that most of the affected teams were being very
conservative with the amount of on-track running they were doing. In
addition, Toyota announced that it had substituted Ricardo Zonta for
Ralf Schumacher, who would take no further part in the event.
Speculation was rife in the paddock that some Michelin teams might not
take part in qualifying. Also, during the practice session, I was
informed there would be a Team Principals¹ meeting with Bernie
Ecclestone at 1430 hrs after qualifying, which I incorrectly assumed
would centre around the Michelin issue.
Qualifying took place, and indeed, all 20 cars qualified for Sunday¹s
Grand Prix.
At approximately 1420 hrs, I attended Bernie¹s office, and with
representatives present from all other teams, including Ferrari, the
meeting commenced. Surprisingly, the main topic of conversation was the
number of events and calendar for 2006, followed by a suggestion that a
meeting be convened at the next Grand Prix to discuss two issues only *
firstly, a proposal for a single-tyre supplier in Formula One, and
secondly, whether or not it would be desirable to qualify with or
without a race fuel load in 2006. Only at the very end of the meeting
did the Michelin tyre issue arise, and in fairness, it was not discussed
in any great detail. I personally found this strange, but as I have
stated, it did not affect Minardi directly, and therefore I had no
reason to pursue the matter.
Throughout Saturday evening, there was considerable speculation in the
paddock that the tyre issue was much more serious than at first thought,
and people were talking about a fresh shipment of tyres being flown
overnight from France, and what penalty the Michelin teams would take
should those tyres be used. By the time I left the paddock, people were
taking bets on Minardi and Jordan scoring points!
Later that evening, I checked with our Sporting Director on what
developments had occurred, and was told that the issue was indeed very
serious, and the possibility existed that the Michelin teams would not
take part in the race.
Sunday, June 19
I arrived at the circuit at 0815 hrs, only to find the paddock was
buzzing with stories suggesting the Michelin teams would be unable to
take part in the Grand Prix. I was then handed a copy of correspondence
between Michelin, the FIA, and the Michelin teams that revealed the true
extent of the problem. By now, journalists were asking if Minardi would
agree to a variation of the regulations to allow the Michelin teams to
compete, and what penalties I felt would be appropriate.
A planned Minardi press briefing took place at 0930 hrs, and as it was
ending, I was summoned to an urgent meeting, along with Jordan, with
Bernie Ecclestone, the two most senior Michelin representatives present
at the circuit, IMS President Tony George, Team Principals, and
technical representatives from the Michelin teams. At this meeting,
Michelin, to its credit, admitted that the tyres available were unable
to complete a race distance around the Indianapolis circuit without a
change to the track configuration, so as to reduce the speed coming out
of the last turn onto the banking. Much background information was
provided as to the enormous efforts that Michelin, with support from its
teams, had undertaken in the preceding 48 hours to try and resolve the
problem, but it was clear that all those efforts had failed to produce a
suitable solution that wouldn¹t involve support from the non-Michelin
teams, and ultimately, the FIA.
What was requested of the Bridgestone teams was to allow a chicane to be
constructed at Turn 13, which would then allow Michelin to advise their
teams that, in their opinion, the tyres would be able to complete the
race distance. It was made very clear that this was the only viable
option available, as previous suggestions from the FIA, such as
speed-limiting the Michelin cars through Turn 13, could, and probably
would, give rise to a monumental accident. This idea, as well as one
concerning the possibility of pit stops every 10 laps, were dismissed,
and discussion returned to the only sensible solution * a chicane.
During this discussion, a technical representative with specific
knowledge of the Indianapolis circuit, together with representatives
from IMS, were tasked with preparing the design of a chicane, and Bernie
Ecclestone agreed to speak with the one Team Principal not present, Mr
Todt, and to inform the FIA President, Max Mosley, who was not present
at Indianapolis, of the planned solution to allow the successful running
of the US Grand Prix. With only a few hours now remaining to the start
of the race, we agreed to reconvene as soon as Bernie had responses from
Messrs Todt and Mosley.
At approximately 1055 hrs, Bernie informed us that not only would Mr
Todt not agree, stating that it was not a Ferrari problem, but an FIA
and a Michelin problem, but also Mr Mosley had stated that if any
attempts were made to alter the circuit, he would cancel the Grand Prix
forthwith. These words had a familiar tone to me, as they were similar
to those I had heard around midnight on the Friday preceding the 2005
Australian Grand Prix, when I was told by all the senior FIA
representatives present that the Australian Grand Prix would be
cancelled forthwith if I did not withdraw pending legal action between
Minardi and the FIA. Once again, Mr Mosley was not present at that Grand
Prix! It is fair to say at this point that the vast majority of people
present in the room both felt and stated that Mr Mosley had completely
overstepped the mark, had no idea whatsoever of the gravity of the
situation, and furthermore, cared even less about the US Grand Prix, its
organisers, the fans, and indeed, the hundreds of millions of television
viewers around the world who were going to be affected by his intransigence.
By this time, the nine teams had discussed running a non- championship
race, or a race in which the Michelin teams could not score points, and
even a race whereby only the Michelin teams used the new chicane, and
indeed, every other possible option that would allow 20 cars to
participate and put on a show, thereby not causing the enormous damage
to Formula One that all those present knew would otherwise occur.
By now, most present felt the only option was to install the chicane and
race, if necessary, without Ferrari, but with 18 cars, in what would
undoubtedly be a non-championship race. We discussed with Bernie the
effects of the FIA withdrawing its staff, and agreed among ourselves a
Race Director, a Safety Car driver, and other essential positions, and
all agreed that, under the circumstances, what was of paramount
importance was that the race must go ahead. All further agreed that
since we would most likely be denied FIA facilities, such as scales and
post-race scrutineering, every competitor would instruct his team and
drivers to conduct themselves in the spirit of providing an entertaining
race for the good of Formula One.
At this point, we called for all 20 drivers, and indeed, all 20 arrived,
at which point we informed them of our plan. While I cannot testify that
each and every driver agreed with what we were proposing, what I can say
with certainty is that no driver disagreed, and indeed, members of the
Grand Prix Drivers¹ Association discussed overseeing the construction of
a suitable chicane. Jean Todt was the only significant team individual
not present, and the Ferrari drivers stated this decision was up to Mr Todt.
I feel it is important to stress that, at this stage, and mindful of the
total impossibility * call it force majeure if you wish * of 14 cars
being able to compete in the race, the nine teams represented agreed
they would not take part in the race unless a solution was found in the
interests of Formula One as a global sport, as it was clear to all
present that the sport, and not the politics, had to prevail if we were
to avoid an impending disaster.
After a short break, we reconvened without the drivers. When I arrived
in Bernie¹s office, Flavio Briatore was on the telephone to Mr Mosley,
and it was quite clear from the body language of the others gathered in
the room that Mr Mosley was having none of our suggestions. At the
conclusion of the telephone call, it was obvious that many of those in
the room had lost all faith in Mr Mosley and his ability to perform his
function as President of the FIA in respect of Formula One matters.
I¹m sure this sentence will be treated with contempt by Mr Mosley, but
what must be realised is that there are various reasons that other Team
Principals, and the most senior people in Formula One, will not say
publicly what they openly feel privately about Mr Mosley, his politics
and his governance of the sport. There is a great temptation to go into
those reasons in detail, but that is for another day. Suffice to say,
those gathered at Indianapolis felt Mr Mosley, and to a lesser degree,
the lack of co-operation from Mr Todt, were about to be responsible for
the greatest FIAsco in Formula One¹s recent history.
Discussions then took place concerning the other telephone calls with Mr
Mosley from, among others, Bernie Ecclestone, Ron Dennis and Tony
George, and it was clearly revealed to what extent Mr Mosley was
prepared to go in order to achieve his aims. To my total disgust, it was
stated that Mosley had informed Mr Martin, the FIA¹s most senior
representative in the USA, that if any kind of non- championship race
was run, or any alteration made to the circuit, the US Grand Prix, and
indeed, all FIA-regulated motorsport in the US, would be under threat *
again, exactly the same tactic that was used in threatening the
Australian Grand Prix and Australian motorsport in March of this year.
By now, it was evident Mosley had bullied the US Grand Prix promoter
into submission, Bernie Ecclestone was powerless to intervene, and all
efforts of the Team Principals, with the exception of Jean Todt, had
failed to save the 2005 US Grand Prix.
At this point, the pit lane had opened and a hasty discussion took place
concerning whether or not the Michelin teams would go to the grid. A
radio had been delivered to me by team personnel at this stage, and I
was able to know which cars were going to the grid. It is interesting to
note that the Jordan Team Principal was not present at this time, and
indeed, it was the Jordans that first proceeded to the grid, followed by
the Ferraris. After discussion with Bernie Ecclestone, it was agreed the
Michelin teams would go to the grid, but were absolutely prevented from
participating in the race because of the tyre situation.
Three teams line up for the US Grand Prix
We then proceeded to the grid, at which point I asked Jordan¹s Colin
Kolles if he intended to stand by the other teams or participate in the
race. In no uncertain terms, I was told Jordan would be racing. I was
also approached by a Bridgestone representative, who informed me that
Bridgestone wished us to race. This left me with one of the most
difficult decisions I have had to take during my time in F1, as I did
not want to race, but given my current relationship with Mr Mosley, felt
certain heavy sanctions would follow if I did not. I made it clear to
Bernie Ecclestone, and several Team Principals, that if the Jordans
either went off or retired, I would withdraw the Minardi cars from the race.
It is important for people to realise that Minardi, the seven Michelin
teams, Bernie Ecclestone, and the promoters did not agree with Mr
Mosley¹s tactics. For the reasons previously outlined, it may take some
considerable time, if ever, for this to be admitted, but there is no
question in my mind that the farce that occurred on Sunday, June 19,
2005 at Indianapolis was the responsibility of the FIA President, Max
Mosley, and compounded by the lack of support from Jean Todt.
For the avoidance of doubt, in my opinion, Michelin was responsible
enough to admit that the problem was of their creation. When one
considers that even the replacement, Barcelona-specification tyres that
were shipped to IMS, when tested, apparently exhibited the same
characteristics as those that originally failed, this clearly is a case
of force majeure, as I do not for a moment believe that Michelin
intentionally brought tyres to the event that were unsuitable for
competition.
Far more importantly, however, Mosley refused to accept any of the
solutions offered, and that refusal was, I believe, politically
motivated. Therefore, I feel he failed in his duty, and that is why I
have called for his resignation.
Much discussion and debate will undoubtedly take place over the coming
weeks and months, but I believe this is a truthful and honest account of
the facts, and not the fiction, surrounding the responsibility for this
FIAsco. People can now make up their own minds!"
Press Release
MinardiF1"